Surface analysis does not reveal the mechanics of the system
The question of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union is usually explained through war, corruption, reforms, negotiations, Europe’s fatigue and the position of individual countries. All of this matters, but this kind of analysis remains on the surface. It describes the circumstances, but it does not reveal the mechanics itself.
According to the Basic Law of Political Economy, any system begins not with money, not with treaties, not with institutions and not with international declarations. It begins with « Personality ». It is « Personality » that forms « Behavior ». Behavior creates « Choice ». Choice gives rise to « Demand ». And only after that do « Money », resources, investment, recognition, the movement of institutions and long-term decisions appear.
Personality → Behavior → Choice → Demand → Money
Therefore, accession to the European Union cannot be viewed only as a legal procedure. The EU does not accept a statement, an emotion, historical pain or political desire. The EU accepts a system. And a system is judged not by what it promises, but by how it behaves over a long distance.
Ukraine is already in the European process
Ukraine has already entered the European process. The European Union opened accession negotiations with Ukraine on 25 June 2024 after the decision of the European Council and the approval of the negotiating framework. This is an important step, but it means recognition of the direction, not rapid accession. Negotiations open the path, but they do not remove the main question: is the Ukrainian system itself ready for stable behaviour inside the European structure?
The main question is not whether Ukraine wants to be part of Europe. This question has already been answered by society, by war, by historical choice and by political course. The main question is different: can Ukraine create such state behaviour that will be reproduced independently of one personality, one president, one administration and one political moment?
This is where the real problem begins.
War is a barrier, but it does not explain everything
War is a huge barrier. It concentrates power, strengthens the role of the state, makes decisions extraordinary, and subordinates many processes to security and survival. But war will end one day. After the war, one major external barrier will disappear, but the internal question will remain: who controls the behaviour of the state?
If the behaviour of the state is controlled by the presidential centre, the system remains dependent on personality. Even when the president leads the country in a European direction, the structure itself remains risky. Today, one personality leads the country towards the EU. Tomorrow, another personality may change the pace, change the priorities, stop reforms, subordinate institutions or make the system less predictable again.
For the European Union, this is a key risk. The EU does not build integration on the hope that every next president will turn out to be the right one. European logic requires another foundation. The behaviour of the state must be anchored in institutions, parliament, courts, government, local self-government, procedures, coalitions and legal restrictions.
The presidential system is not always weak, but it is not the European logic
Here it is important to close the main counterargument in advance. A presidential system in itself does not always mean immediate weakness. There are states where presidential power coexists with courts, parliament, procedures and a system of checks and balances. But this does not make such a model European by its nature.
The United States shows a different type of stability, but this stability is relative. It was formed over almost 250 years and rests on a historically developed balance of power, a federal structure, the role of the states, the Supreme Court, Congress, the army, the dollar and global influence. However, for the modern world this model looks increasingly outdated, because too much in it is still tied to the figure of the president, the struggle between two major political centres and the ability of one personality to sharply change the behaviour of the state.
There, presidential power is embedded in a federal state that is itself a separate global pole. The United States does not enter someone else’s supranational system and does not need to prove compatibility with the European Union. It created its own model and maintained it through the strength of institutions, capital, the army and the dollar. But this does not make the American presidential system a universal model for other countries.
Moreover, the modern crisis of the United States shows the weakness of such a structure. When the personality of the president begins to influence the behaviour of the entire system too strongly, the country enters a state of internal turbulence. It is not only policy that changes. The behaviour of the state itself changes. For the twenty-first century, such dependence becomes increasingly dangerous, because the speed of decisions, the power of media, algorithms, social division and global crises amplify the influence of personality on the entire system.
Therefore, the American example does not refute this conclusion, but strengthens it. A presidential model can exist for a long time in a country that is itself a global centre of power. But for Ukraine, which seeks to enter the European Union, this logic does not fit. Ukraine is not building a separate global centre. Ukraine must prove compatibility with the European system, where rules, institutions, parliament, procedures and limits on power are more important than one personality at the centre of the state.
Europe and the United States are not on the same path as models of future stability
According to this logic, Europe and the United States are not on the same path as models of future stability. They may be allies, partners and participants in the same political space of the West, but their internal mechanics are different. The United States relies on a presidential federal state and global power. Europe relies on rules, procedures, coordination, institutions and the limitation of personal power. These are two different ways of holding a system together.
France does not weaken the argument, but clarifies it
France does not weaken this argument either. On the contrary, it clarifies it. France was laying the foundation of the future European Union before the Gaullist strengthening of presidential power. The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in Paris in 1951, and the Treaties of Rome, which created the European Economic Community and Euratom, were signed in 1957. The Fifth Republic, with its new constitutional structure, appeared only in 1958, and direct presidential elections were introduced in 1962.
This means that the French example cannot be used as simple proof of the compatibility of a strong presidential model with European logic. France participated in the creation of the European structure before de Gaulle strengthened the presidency. Then it integrated its Fifth Republic into an already developing European system, relying on a historical state tradition, bureaucracy, courts, parliament, European law and the status of a founding country.
But Ukraine is in a different position. Ukraine is not a founding country of the EU. It is not entering a system with historically accumulated trust. It comes to the European Union from outside, after war, with a damaged economy, a strong role of the presidential centre and the need to prove that its European choice does not depend on one personality.
Therefore, the question for Ukraine is not whether a presidential system can be strong in general. In theory, it can. The more precise question is whether a strong presidential centre helps Ukraine become compatible with the European Union faster. The answer is negative. For a country that is only entering the European system, dependence on one personality does not accelerate trust. It creates doubt.
A parliamentary republic separates the behaviour of the state from personality
A parliamentary republic in the Ukrainian case is important not as a dogma and not as a magical form of government. It is important as the clearest way to separate the behaviour of the state from one personality. In a parliamentary model, power is distributed. Decisions pass through parties, coalitions, parliament, government, committees, procedures and public accountability. The state begins to behave not as a vertical structure of one centre, but as a system of mutual restraints.
According to the Basic Law, this changes the entire chain.
When « Personality » stops being the main source of state behaviour, « Behavior » itself becomes more stable. When behaviour becomes stable, the « Choice » in favour of the EU no longer depends on one president. When the choice is fixed in the system, a permanent « Demand » for integration emerges. And when demand becomes stable, « Money », investment, trust, negotiating chapters, political recognition and institutional rapprochement begin to move.
This is why Ukraine will not join the European Union in the near future not only because of the war. The war remains a heavy but temporary factor. The deeper reason lies in the structure of power. As long as the Ukrainian system depends on the presidential centre, the European Union will see the risk of personalisation of the state.
Turkey shows the loss of systemic compatibility
The comparison with Turkey shows this mechanism especially clearly.
Turkey was once much closer to the European Union than it seems today. It received candidate status in 1999, began accession negotiations in 2005, but since June 2018 these negotiations have been in a state of actual stagnation.
Why did this happen? Turkey did not simply face technical difficulties. It began to lose systemic compatibility. The centre of power became increasingly concentrated around one personality and one political direction. Institutions became less independent. The behaviour of the state became less predictable for Europe.
Through the Basic Law, this looks consistent. The « Personality » at the centre of power changed the « Behavior » of the system. The new behavior changed the « Choice » of the European Union. The EU’s choice reduced the « Demand » for Turkish integration. After that, the movement of « Money », trust, negotiations and political rapprochement stopped.
Turkey showed how a country can come closer to the EU and then move away from it not only because of foreign policy or the economy, but because of a change in the internal logic of power. When a system is built around personality, it loses compatibility with a system built around rules.
Ukraine is in a different situation, but the evaluation mechanism is the same
Ukraine is in a different historical situation. Ukraine does not fully repeat Turkey. Ukraine is moving towards the EU after war, the threat of destruction and the struggle for its own future. But the evaluation mechanism remains the same. The European Union will look not only at suffering, not only at heroism and not only at political statements. It will look at the behavior of the system.
If, after the war, Ukraine preserves a strong presidential model, the accession process will move slowly. Even with strong European support. Even with the formal continuation of negotiations. Even with public agreement inside Ukraine. Because for the EU the main question will remain: what will happen after the personality at the centre of power changes.
If, after the war, Ukraine moves to a parliamentary republic, the situation will change much faster. The EU will see not simply a country asking for accession. It will see a system that begins to behave according to European logic. Not through one personality, but through institutions. Not through a vertical structure, but through procedures. Not through the will of the president, but through reproducible state behavior.
This does not mean automatic accession. A parliamentary republic does not cancel the problems of corruption, the economy, courts, reconstruction, security and the fulfilment of European requirements. But it changes the main thing: the source of the system’s behavior. And it is precisely the source of behavior that determines further choice, demand and the movement of money.
Surface conclusion and systemic conclusion
Surface analysis says: Ukraine will not join the European Union quickly because there is a war. This conclusion looks logical, but it is incomplete. War is indeed a huge obstacle. It destroys the economy, changes the priorities of the state, increases dependence on external aid, concentrates power and transfers the entire system into survival mode. But if the analysis stops only at war, the main point may remain unseen. War explains the delay, but it does not explain the full depth of the problem.
Systemic analysis through the Basic Law of Political Economy shows it more precisely: war only intensified the problem, but did not create it completely. The main barrier lies deeper. It is connected to the fact that Ukraine’s state behaviour is still not sufficiently separated from the personality at the centre of power. As long as key decisions, the direction of reforms, the pace of movement towards the EU and political stability itself depend too strongly on the presidential centre, the European Union will see a risk.
The problem is not one specific president. The problem is the structure itself, in which the personality at the centre of power is capable of determining the behaviour of the entire system. Today this personality may lead the country towards Europe. Tomorrow another personality may change the speed, change the priorities, weaken reforms or move the centre of governance back into a personal vertical. For the European Union, such a model remains insufficiently predictable.
According to the Basic Law, everything begins with « Personality ». If the « Personality » at the centre of power controls the behaviour of the state, then the « Behavior » of the system remains dependent. If behavior is dependent, the « Choice » in favour of Europe does not become finally fixed. If the choice is not fixed, the « Demand » for integration remains a political course, not a stable systemic need. Then the movement of « Money », investment, trust, negotiations and institutional recognition also remains limited.
- As long as the European choice lives in the president, it remains a political direction.
- When the European choice lives in institutions, it becomes the behavior of the system.
This is where the real boundary lies. The European Union does not accept the strength of power, the loudness of statements or the personal determination of one leader. It accepts predictability of behaviour. The EU must see a system that remains understandable after a change of president, after a change of government, after elections, after a crisis and after the end of the war. For Europe, what matters is not one correct leader, but a state structure in which even a weak leader cannot destroy the general course.
The European Union accepts not a temporary direction, but a fixed model. It looks not only at where the country is moving today, but at whether it will be able to move in the same direction tomorrow without dependence on one personality. This is why the Ukrainian question is not only a question of war, reconstruction and reforms. It is a question of the source of state behaviour.
The main question for Ukraine after the war
Ukraine’s path to the European Union will not accelerate simply after the end of the war. The end of the war will remove a huge external barrier, but by itself it will not create European compatibility. After the war, Ukraine will face a deeper choice: to preserve a state system in which the presidential centre remains the main source of behaviour, or to move to a model in which the behaviour of the state is fixed in institutions.
If Ukraine remains a presidential system with a strong centre, the accession process will be long and cautious. The European Union will continue negotiations, open and close chapters, check reforms, allocate aid and support reconstruction. But inside this process, the main question will remain: what will happen after the change of personality at the centre of power? Will the European course remain? Will reforms remain? Will independent institutions remain? Will the predictability of state behaviour remain?
If, after the war, Ukraine moves to a parliamentary republic and fixes the European choice in institutions, the process may become much faster. Not because a parliamentary republic automatically solves all problems. It does not cancel corruption, weak courts, economic difficulties, the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure and the need to fulfil EU requirements. But it changes the main thing: the source of the system’s behaviour.
- In a presidential model, the source of behaviour is often located in one centre.
- In a parliamentary model, the source of behaviour is transferred into the system.
This is a fundamental difference. When power is distributed between parliament, government, coalitions, parties, committees, courts, local self-government and procedures, the state becomes less dependent on one personality. It may become more complex, slower and more conflictual, but it becomes more predictable. And for the European Union, predictability is more important than the speed of one political decision.
The final question for Ukraine after the war is not whether Ukraine seeks to be in Europe. This question has already been resolved historically, politically and socially.
The final question is different: who will control the behaviour of the Ukrainian state after the war, personality or institutions?
If the answer remains personality, the European Union will wait. It will be cautious, because personality is always finite, replaceable and unpredictable. Even a strong personality cannot guarantee the behaviour of the state for decades ahead.
If the answer becomes institutions, Ukraine will become closer to the European Union not in words, but by the very mechanics of the system. Then the European choice will cease to be the course of one president, one administration or one historical moment. It will become stable state behaviour.
This is precisely the main conclusion through the Basic Law of Political Economy.
Ukraine will move closer to the European Union not when the war simply ends, and not when another political promise appears. Ukraine will move closer to the EU when « Personality » stops being the main source of state behaviour, when « Behavior » becomes fixed in institutions, when « Choice » becomes reproducible, when « Demand » for integration becomes permanent, and when « Money », investment, trust and political recognition begin to move not towards a separate authority, but towards a stable system.
Iv.Spolan
Author of the model “Basic Law of Political Economy”
