A strong state is not defined only by the number of police officers, the size of the army, or the amount of the security budget. These indicators matter, but they do not explain the main issue: how well the very construction of the state is protected from corruption, political capture, concentration of power, and external influence.
The security system is not simply a set of agencies that maintain order, investigate crimes, and apply coercion on behalf of the state. It is one of the key elements of the Form of the System. It is through security structures that the state shows how it protects the law, how it limits power, how it responds to crime, and how it prevents one group from gaining control over the entire mechanism of coercion.
If this question is viewed through The Fundamental Law of Political Economy, it becomes clear that the structure of security bodies affects not only security itself. It affects the Behaviour of society, the Choice of the individual, the Demand for protection, Money, and the Direction of Money. Ultimately, it affects the Form of the System itself.
When coercive power is concentrated in one centre, the state gains simplicity of management. But at the same time, it creates a dangerous point of concentration. If this centre falls under corrupt, political, or external influence, almost the entire security system of the state is placed at risk.
That is why, in a number of European countries, security functions have historically been divided between different structures, ministries, and levels of government. This model is not accidental bureaucratic complexity. It is a way to prevent state power from becoming a monopoly of one administrative centre.
Europe uses different models
There is no single universal model for organising police and security bodies in Europe. Some states build their system around a strong Ministry of the Interior. This model is simpler, cheaper, faster to manage, and more convenient for vertical command.
But there is also another approach. In this model, security functions are distributed between several different circuits: civilian police, military-type structures with police functions, financial police, the penitentiary system, the prosecutor’s office, the courts, and the municipal level.
The meaning of this model is not to create more agencies for the sake of quantity. Its meaning is to ensure that state force is not gathered in one hand. If everything depends on one centre, that centre becomes too important. Through it, pressure can be applied to society, business, courts, local self-government, and political opponents.
The divided model works differently. It creates several verticals, several sources of information, and several lawful channels of response. One structure may be responsible for public order, another for the military or second security circuit, a third for financial crimes, a fourth for the penitentiary system, and a fifth for the local level.
Such a system is more complex. It is more expensive. It requires coordination. But it is precisely this complexity that creates protection against the capture of the state through one administrative node.
Italy as the main example of a divided model
Italy is one of the most illustrative examples of a divided security system in Europe.
Several major security structures operate in Italy at the same time: Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri, Guardia di Finanza, Polizia Penitenziaria, and Polizia Locale. The Italian Ministry of the Interior, through the Department of Public Security, is responsible for order, public security, and the coordination of police forces; Carabinieri have a military nature and their own system of tasks; Guardia di Finanza is an economic and financial police force; and the penitentiary system is located within the circuit of the Ministry of Justice.
Here it is important not to confuse the terms. In Italy, the central example of the second security circuit is precisely Carabinieri. In this article, they should be called Carabinieri, not gendarmerie. Gendarmerie nationale in France is a separate example from another country, not the name of the Italian model.
Polizia di Stato is the civilian state police. It is connected with internal security, public order, investigations, and everyday police work.
Carabinieri are a separate corps with a military nature and police functions. They take part in maintaining public order, perform police tasks, and at the same time preserve a connection with the defence logic of the state. Official materials of Carabinieri indicate that the corps has different lines of dependence: as an armed force for military tasks, and also as a structure performing functions related to public order and security.
Guardia di Finanza is a separate structure of economic and financial police. Its significance goes far beyond ordinary tax inspections. It works with financial crimes, economic crime, illegal movement of money, money laundering, smuggling, and the protection of the financial interests of the state. Official documents of Guardia di Finanza describe it as a modern police corps designed to prevent and counter economic and financial crime.
Polizia Penitenziaria is located within the penitentiary system. The Italian Ministry of Justice states that the Department of Penitentiary Administration operates within the Ministry of Justice and is responsible for measures related to the detention of prisoners, personnel management, and the penitentiary system.
Polizia Locale or Polizia Municipale operates at the local level. Its powers depend on specific legislation, municipality, and region, but the very existence of a local police level adds another layer of control between central power and society.
At first glance, such a system may seem overloaded. But it is precisely in this system that the main point becomes visible: the state does not hand all force over to one agency. The security system is divided into several circuits, and each of them covers its own part of state resilience.
Why Italy is important for this analysis
Italy is important not because its model is ideal. It has high costs, complex coordination, overlapping powers, competition between structures, and a constant need for agreement.
But Italy is important as an example of a state that has historically faced the mafia, corruption, regional clans, the shadow economy, political influence, and organised criminal networks. In such an environment, an overly centralised security system would be convenient not only for the state, but also for those who would seek to control that state.
If it is enough for a criminal or corrupt network to influence only one security vertical, the state becomes vulnerable. But if there are different structures with different powers and different institutional logic, full control becomes much more difficult.
This does not mean that a divided model completely eliminates corruption. No administrative construction can remove corruption by itself. But a divided model makes corruption more expensive, more complex, and less stable.
Corruption needs a simple scheme. It needs a clear entry point, a clear superior, a clear chain of decisions, and a clear way to block an investigation. A divided system destroys this simplicity.
If one agency is infected by corruption, another may preserve its independence. If one channel is closed, another may remain open. If one structure does not want to see a problem, another may see it through its own competence.
This is the protective function of the Italian model.
Other European variants: France, Spain, Portugal, and Germany
Italy shows one version of a divided security system — through Carabinieri, civilian police, financial police, penitentiary police, and the municipal level.
In France, a similar logic is implemented differently — through Gendarmerie nationale. These are not Carabinieri, but Gendarmerie nationale: a structure of military nature that performs police functions and participates in the internal security system. Official sources of Gendarmerie nationale and the Ministry of the Interior describe it as a military force with tasks in the field of public security, judicial police, maintenance of order, and defence resilience.
In Spain, a similar role is performed by Guardia Civil. It is a security force of military nature with national powers. The European gendarmerie structure directly describes Guardia Civil as a state security force of military nature with nationwide competence.
In Portugal, Guarda Nacional Republicana operates. It also belongs to structures of the gendarmerie type: it consists of military elements, follows military organisation, and performs security tasks.
Germany is organised differently. There, the federal structure plays an important role: there is a federal police force, while a significant part of everyday police work is carried out at the level of the Länder. The official website of Bundespolizei describes the Federal Police as a separate federal security structure, while the German Ministry of the Interior separately indicates the role of federal forces and the forces of the federal states.
These models are not the same. Italian Carabinieri are not French Gendarmerie nationale. French Gendarmerie nationale is not Spanish Guardia Civil. The German model is not built around gendarmerie at all, but around the federal distribution of powers.
But the general principle is repeated: the state should not be organised in such a way that all security power depends on one administrative centre.
Overlapping powers as protection, not only as a problem
One of the controversial elements of the divided model is the overlap of powers. At first glance, this is a drawback. Several services may work on similar categories of crimes, compete with each other, dispute competence, and duplicate part of the work.
But in the field of security, overlapping powers are not always a disadvantage. In a number of cases, they are one of the main protective mechanisms of the state.
Crime rarely exists in pure form. Drugs may be linked to money laundering. Money laundering may be linked to corruption. Corruption may be linked to political protection. Political protection may be linked to pressure on investigations. Pressure on investigations may be linked to the threat of state-institution capture.
If all of this falls into only one system, a criminal network receives a clear task: to control that system.
But if different bodies can respond, closing the entire process becomes much more difficult. One agency may fail to see the problem, but another may raise it. One structure may come under pressure, but another may preserve independence. One channel may be blocked, but another may continue to work.
That is why overlapping powers should not always be treated as a mistake. In a properly built system, this is not chaos, but an additional level of protection.
For the state, it is important not only to avoid duplication. It is important not to create a situation in which corruption, a criminal group, or an external force knows that it is enough to control one office, one department, one minister, or one vertical.
Financial police and the direction of money
Financial police or separate structures dealing with economic and financial crimes have special significance.
Through The Fundamental Law of Political Economy, it is visible that money by itself does not determine the form of the state. The decisive factor is the direction of money. Money can go into development, production, education, infrastructure, security, and quality of life. But it can also go into corruption, bribery, shadow networks, political influence, criminal groups, information operations, and external control.
If the state does not control the destructive direction of money, that money begins to change the system itself. It buys decisions, creates dependencies, forms corrupt connections, and influences officials, courts, police, media, parties, and local administrations.
Therefore, financial police are not a secondary element. They are one of the key instruments for protecting the state from the transformation of money into a mechanism for capturing power.
In the Italian model, this role is especially visible through Guardia di Finanza. It shows that the fight against crime cannot be limited only to arresting executors. The state must see the financial flow, because it is often through money that the real management of a criminal or external network takes place.
If money goes into production, development, and the normal economy, it strengthens society. If money goes into corruption and the capture of institutions, it begins to change the Form of the System. And when the Form of the System changes, it returns backwards and influences Behaviour, Choice, and Personality.
The individual stops believing in the law. Business stops believing in fair competition. Society begins to treat connections, bribes, rule-bypassing, and defensive behaviour as normal.
Therefore, control over the direction of money is not only a financial question. It is a question of state resilience.
Municipal police as the lower level of protection
Municipal police are often perceived as a secondary structure. They are associated with parking, traffic, markets, minor violations, local order, and administrative control.
But the local level has a deeper meaning. It is at this level that the state comes closest to the real life of the individual. Municipal police see streets, districts, local conflicts, illegal trade, pressure on entrepreneurs, schemes around land, construction, transport, migration, and local administration.
If all information goes only through central structures, the state may lose contact with the real behaviour of society. A central agency sees statistics, but it does not always see the local environment.
Municipal police should not replace national police. But they can be an additional sensor of the state. They create another level of observation, response, and control between central power and society.
For countries under external pressure, this is especially important. External influence often works not only through the capital, but also through local connections, business networks, municipal groups, local media, administrative pressure, and local corruption.
If the municipal level is weak, an adversary or a corrupt network can entrench itself from below. If the municipal level is integrated into the general legal system and has reasonable powers, it becomes part of the protective shell of the state.
The second security circuit
After the example of Italy, it is important to speak precisely, without confusion.
- In Italy — Carabinieri.
- In France — Gendarmerie nationale.
- In Spain — Guardia Civil.
- In Portugal — Guarda Nacional Republicana.
In general analysis, all of this may be called the second security circuit. Legally, these are not the same thing, but systemically they perform a similar function: alongside ordinary civilian police, there is another security structure connected with discipline, defence logic, territorial resilience, or military nature.
Such a circuit is especially important in crisis conditions. Civilian police deal with ordinary crime, public order, and the protection of citizens. But during hybrid threats, sabotage, pressure on critical infrastructure, military risk, or internal destabilisation, the state may need a structure that is closer to the defence system.
This does not mean that the second circuit should replace civilian police. That would be dangerous. Civilian police should remain the foundation of everyday security. But the second circuit is needed so that the state does not have a single point of failure.
If one structure is overloaded, another must be able to act. If one channel is paralysed, another must remain operational. If the civilian system encounters a military-type threat, the state should not have to start from zero.
Centralisation of force and the risk of political capture
The main problem of a centralised security system is not only corruption. Political capture is even more dangerous.
If one political group gains control over the only security vertical, it receives an instrument of pressure on society. Through such a system, pressure can be applied to business, opponents, media, courts, municipalities, and independent institutions.
Outwardly, the state may remain strong. But internally, it begins to lose its legal nature. The security system ceases to be an instrument of the state and becomes an instrument of a group.
Through The Fundamental Law of Political Economy, this means deformation of the Form of the System. The state begins to return pressure back onto society. Demand becomes defensive. People begin to demand not development, but security from the state itself. Choice narrows. Behaviour becomes cautious, dependent, and adaptive. Personality loses space for independence.
Therefore, the separation of security structures matters not only for the police. It affects the entire social environment.
If a person understands that all channels of protection depend on one centre, he begins to seek not law, but access to that centre. If business understands that all threats and inspections come from one vertical, it begins to pay not for development, but for security. If society sees that the security system serves one group, trust in the state is destroyed.
Thus, centralisation of security power changes not only administration. It changes human behaviour.
External threat and hybrid pressure
For countries located next to a potential adversary, the question of security architecture becomes a question of national security.
Modern external pressure rarely begins only with a direct military strike. First come information operations, corrupt ties, political influence, economic penetration, work with local elites, pressure on security bodies, discrediting of institutions, and the creation of controlled chaos.
If the entire security system is closed into one centre, it is easier for the adversary to work. It searches for one entry point, one personnel vertical, one political channel, one influence group, or one leader.
But if the system is divided, the adversary cannot be sure that control over one structure will provide control over the entire mechanism of state coercion.
One service may be under influence, but another may preserve independence. One channel may be closed, but another may launch an investigation. One agency may fail to respond, but another may see the threat from a different side.
For the adversary, such a system is inconvenient. For the state, it is more resilient.
This is the meaning of the separation of security structures for countries under external pressure: the state should not have one point through which the entire security mechanism can be paralysed.
Significance for the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland
For the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland, this topic has special significance. These states are located in a zone of direct or potential pressure from Russia. Therefore, their security system should be considered not only as an instrument of internal order, but also as part of defence resilience.
It is dangerous when everything depends on one ministry. It is dangerous when all internal security passes through one centre. It is dangerous when there is no second security circuit. It is dangerous when the municipal level is weak. It is dangerous when financial investigations do not have sufficient independence. It is dangerous when military police are limited to overly narrow tasks and are not integrated into the overall system of crisis resilience.
For such countries, it is not necessary to completely change the existing system. A more realistic path is the gradual strengthening of the second circuit.
This may mean expanding the powers of military police, developing functions of the gendarmerie type where this corresponds to the national legal system, strengthening financial investigations, strengthening municipal police, expanding cooperation with the prosecutor’s office, and creating separate procedures for crimes related to external influence, sabotage, financing of hostile networks, and hybrid operations.
The point is not to create more agencies for the sake of quantity. The point is to ensure that the state has no single point of failure.
If one centre is paralysed, another must act. If one structure is under pressure, another must have a legal ability to intervene. If one channel is infected by corruption, another must preserve independence. If an external adversary tries to influence the system, it must not understand that it is enough to control one door.
Divided force must be limited by law
The separation of security structures by itself is not a guarantee of freedom. If many services are created without clear rules, the result may be not resilience, but institutional conflict, duplication, chaos, and a struggle for powers.
Therefore, the divided model must be connected with law. Each structure must have precise powers, a clear area of responsibility, judicial control, prosecutorial oversight, parliamentary review, and transparent procedures of interaction.
Force must be divided, but not uncontrolled.
This is where the balance lies. The state must be strong enough to protect itself from corruption, crime, and external pressure. But it must not be built in such a way that the security system itself begins to pressure the individual and society.
If the security system becomes strong but unlawful, it begins to destroy what it is supposed to protect. People stop trusting the state. Business moves into defensive behaviour. Money is directed not into development, but into survival. Society loses initiative.
Therefore, the correct model is not simply more force. The correct model is divided force, limited by law.
Why this is connected with The Fundamental Law of Political Economy
The Fundamental Law of Political Economy is important here not as a separate theory inside the article, but as a way to see the consequences of security architecture.
Security structures belong to the Form of the System. But the Form of the System does not remain somewhere above, separate from the individual. It returns backwards and affects Demand, Choice, Behaviour, and Personality.
If the security system is built as a monopoly of one centre, society gradually begins to live in the logic of dependence on that centre. The individual chooses more cautiously. Business acts defensively. Money goes not only into development, but also into risk insurance, connections, workarounds, legal protection, political access, or corrupt payments.
If the security system is divided, balanced, and limited by law, it creates a different environment. The individual understands that the state is not one closed vertical. Business sees more legal channels of protection. Money depends less on one administrative entry point. Society receives more space for independent behaviour.
That is why security architecture is not a technical question of the Ministry of the Interior. It is a question of the entire Form of the System.
Main conclusion
The separation of security structures in Europe should not be viewed as a bureaucratic peculiarity or as a historical accident. It is one of the ways to protect the state from the monopoly of force.
Civilian police are responsible for public order and everyday security. In Italy, the second circuit is represented by Carabinieri. In France, a similar logic is expressed through Gendarmerie nationale. In Spain and Portugal, their own structures of the gendarmerie type operate. Financial police protect the state from the destructive direction of money. The penitentiary system separates the execution of punishment from the general police. Municipal police connect the state with the local level. The prosecutor’s office and courts create legal control.
Together, this forms not simply a security system, but a protective construction of the state.
If the security system is concentrated in one centre, it is easier to control, but also easier to capture. If it is divided between several independent verticals, it is more expensive, more complex, and sometimes slower, but it is more resilient.
For countries under the threat of external pressure, especially the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland, this has significance not only as an administrative reform, but also as an element of national security.
The adversary must not have the ability to gain influence over the entire mechanism of state coercion through one centre. Corruption must not have the ability to buy one vertical and block the state through it. A political group must not have the ability to turn the entire security system into its own instrument.
A strong security system is not a system in which the state can do everything.
A strong security system is a system in which no one can take the entire state for themselves.
Iv.Spolan
Author of the model “The Fundamental Law of Political Economy”
