At the end of May 2026, Italy is not holding parliamentary elections. This must be made clear from the beginning in order not to create a false framework. This is a municipal vote: mayors and municipal councils are being elected in hundreds of communes. Among the notable cities are Venice, Reggio Calabria, Lecco, Mantua, Arezzo, Pistoia, Prato, Fermo, Macerata, Chieti, Avellino, Andria, Trani, Crotone and Salerno. Where there is no winner in the first round, the second round becomes a separate political test.
Formally, these are local elections. But in reality, they become a test for Italy’s entire political system. The country approaches them after several years of Giorgia Meloni’s rule, after the strengthening of the right-wing bloc, and after a serious political blow to the government in the referendum on judicial reform. Therefore, the main question is not: will power change in Italy after these elections? No, it will not. The main question is different:
Will the right-wing bloc preserve its political initiative before the 2027 parliamentary campaign, or is Italy entering a phase of more intense competition?
The right-wing bloc in Italy is represented above all by Giorgia Meloni and the party Fratelli d’Italia, Matteo Salvini and the party Lega, Antonio Tajani and the party Forza Italia. These are not identical forces. They have different voters, different styles and different interests. Fratelli d’Italia builds the image of a national conservative centre of power. Lega is traditionally strong through the themes of autonomy, migration, security, the north and small business. Forza Italia remains more moderate, more connected with business, the European right-wing tradition and the old political legacy of Silvio Berlusconi.
But together they form one large political line: Italy must preserve more national independence, submit less to the bureaucratic pressure of the European Union, control migration more strictly, protect small business, the family economy, cash and the traditional structure of Italian everyday life.
This is where the main conflict begins.
The main conflict is not only between the right and the left
Italian elections cannot be explained only through the struggle between the right and the left. This old scheme is already too narrow. The real conflict is deeper. Italy is facing the question of what economic freedom means in modern society.
For one part of Italians, freedom means the ability to live without full digital control. It means cash, family business, local agreements, the autonomy of the small entrepreneur, flexibility, private services, less state interference and less bank control. For this part of society, money must remain not only a digital record in the banking system, but also a living instrument of everyday independence.
For another part of society, freedom means something else. It means transparent rules, an honest tax system, protection of workers, financing of healthcare, schools, transport, pensions, social guarantees and the fight against those who live from the shadow economy while using common infrastructure. For these people, digitalisation and tax control do not look like enslavement. They look like a way to make the system fairer.
Both positions exist inside Italy. Both have their own logic. That is why the conflict is so important. This is not a simple story where one side is good and the other is bad. It is a struggle between two different understandings of freedom.
- One side says: the state must not see every step a person takes and every movement of their money.
- The other side answers: if part of the economy hides in the shadows, everyone else pays for it through taxes, prices and weaker public services.
Italy is becoming one of the main countries in Europe where this dispute appears especially clearly.
Why the issue of cash in Italy has become political
Italy is not like the northern countries of Europe. Family money, real estate, inheritance, small business, restaurants, cafés, tourism, services, crafts, local trade, private services and cash turnover play a huge role here. That is why official statistics often show poorly the real amount of money inside society.
One can look at official salaries and see one picture. But then a person goes outside and sees another picture: full restaurants, full cafés, active services, expensive cars, expensive holidays, constant consumption, spending on food, clothes, pleasures, tourism and personal services. This is not the image of a poor country. This is the image of a country where a significant part of money moves in ways that are not convenient to count in official reports.
This is exactly why the right receives support not only through migration. It receives support through the defence of the familiar Italian economic culture.
For a significant part of society, cash is not simply a way to avoid taxes. It is part of a way of life. A person can work in a family business, receive part of the income directly, help relatives, pay a craftsman, a driver, a waiter, a worker, a private specialist, a small contractor. There is a lot of informality in this system, but it is precisely this informality that has given Italy flexibility for decades.
The problem is that this model also has another side. If too large a part of the economy goes into the shadows, the state loses revenue. Then officially employed people face a higher burden. A business that pays everything openly finds itself in a less favourable position. A worker on an official contract pays everything, while part of another economy lives by more flexible rules.
That is why, for the left part of society, the fight against the shadow economy does not look like an attack on freedom, but like the restoration of fairness.
This is where the political nerve of Italy lies.
What the right wants
The right in Italy enters these elections with several clear political positions.
First position: the protection of national sovereignty inside the European Union. Giorgia Meloni does not build her campaign on an immediate exit of Italy from the European Union. That would be too risky for a country deeply connected with the European market, funds, the financial system and the common currency. But she demands more independence. The right-wing voter wants Rome not to look like an executor of Brussels’ decisions. He wants Italy to be able to define its own migration policy, budget priorities, attitude to small business, tax system and internal model of development.
Second position: the protection of small business. Italy is not built only on large companies. A huge part of the country lives through family enterprises, restaurants, cafés, shops, workshops, repair services, tourism, transport, private services and local connections. For these people, bureaucracy, inspections, mandatory digital payments, bank commissions and tax control are not abstract reforms, but direct pressure on everyday work.
Third position: the protection of cash. Fratelli d’Italia and Lega understand that this issue is emotionally powerful. Cash in Italy is perceived as part of personal autonomy. Therefore, the issue of limits, payment control and mandatory digitalisation has political weight. The right speaks to those who do not want every payment to become a record available to the bank, the tax authority and the control system.
Fourth position: migration and security. Italy remains one of the main countries facing Mediterranean migration pressure. For the right, this issue remains central because it connects the border, state spending, security, the cultural environment and trust in power. The right-wing voter often perceives migration as proof that the state controls its own citizens too strictly, but does not control external flows strictly enough.
Fifth position: institutional reforms. Giorgia Meloni tried to show that the right is capable not only of managing current policy, but also of changing the structure of the state. However, here she suffered a serious blow. In March 2026, Italians rejected the government’s judicial reform. This became a political defeat for Giorgia Meloni and showed that her power is not unconditional.
The problem of the right is not the absence of a strong agenda, but its internal contradiction. Its language is simpler, more emotional and more understandable: to protect Italy, cash, borders, small business, family, the local economy and the familiar way of life. This frame works well because it appeals to the fear of losing a familiar world. But this position has a weak point. The right promises to protect the flexibility of the Italian economy, but does not always explain how to combine this flexibility with state debt, the financing of healthcare, schools, transport, pensions and real support for young people. The defence of cash and small business has a strong political effect, but by itself it does not answer the question of where the state should obtain stable resources for the future. Therefore, the right wins through the language of protection, but faces difficulty when it has to move from protecting the old model to creating a new functioning system.
What the left and centre-left, currently in opposition, want
The left and centre-left in Italy approach these elections with a different logic. If the right speaks about protecting cash, small business, borders and national autonomy, the opposition speaks about social justice, a transparent economy, the protection of workers, affordable housing, healthcare, education and the fight against inequality. The mistake of weak analysis is that it portrays all opponents of Giorgia Meloni simply as “people of Brussels”. That is wrong. The left and centre-left have their own social base and their own understanding of Italy’s future.
First position: social justice and the protection of workers. Partito Democratico under the leadership of Elly Schlein relies on those voters who believe that Italy has lived too long with an imbalance between protected and unprotected layers of society. For this part of society, the main issues are wages, labour rights, stable contracts, protection of workers, the fight against poverty and the reduction of the gap between rich regions, poor territories and young people without a stable future.
Second position: a transparent economy and honest taxation. For the left, Italy’s problem is not that the state controls too much, but that too large a part of the economy lives in the shadows. Their logic is simple: if part of business hides turnover, if part of income passes through cash and does not enter the tax system, then the burden falls on those who pay everything officially. Therefore, for them, digitalisation and tax control are not the destruction of freedom, but an attempt to make the rules fairer.
Third position: healthcare, education and the social state. The left and centre-left believe that without normal tax revenue, Italy will not be able to finance hospitals, schools, universities, transport, housing, support for families and social protection. For them, the question of transparency is connected not only with taxes, but with the quality of the state. If money goes into the shadows, the state becomes weaker, and the ordinary citizen receives worse services.
Fourth position: youth, housing and the future inside Italy. For Partito Democratico, Movimento 5 Stelle and Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra, the situation of young Italians remains an important issue. Young people face low wages, unstable contracts, expensive housing, dependence on the family and weak career mobility. Some young people leave Italy, and this becomes a hidden political problem: the country loses not only working hands, but also future voters, future entrepreneurs and the future energy of renewal.
Fifth position: ecology, the urban environment and quality of life. Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra and part of the centre-left focus on transport, ecology, housing, the protection of cities from chaotic tourism, the development of public services and a more sustainable model of urban life. For them, municipal elections are especially important, because it is at the city level that issues of transport, rent, construction, waste, air, public spaces and everyday accessibility are decided.
Sixth position: limiting the power of the right and protecting institutions. After the government’s defeat in the referendum on judicial reform, the opposition received a strong argument: Giorgia Meloni can be stopped if different forces unite against a concrete decision. Therefore, for the left and centre-left, municipal elections become not only a struggle for cities, but also a test of their ability to build a broad anti-right front before the 2027 parliamentary elections.
The problem of the left and centre-left is not the absence of themes, but the complexity of their political language. Their agenda is broader, but less emotionally simple. The right formulates its position briefly and clearly: to protect Italy, cash, borders, small business and the familiar way of life. Such a frame is easily perceived by the voter because it speaks about protecting an already familiar world. The opposition has a more difficult task. It must explain that economic transparency, tax control, the social state and the fight against the shadow system are not an attack on freedom, but should work as a mechanism of fairness. But in Italy the word “control” itself sounds dangerous to many people, because it is associated not with honest rules, but with pressure from the state, banks and bureaucracy on everyday life.
In this sense, municipal elections acquire a common political meaning for both sides. For the right, they are a test of the stability of power, the strength of local candidates and the ability to preserve control over the political agenda before 2027. For the left and centre-left, they are a test of the ability to go beyond criticism, gather different groups of voters, reach agreements in the second round and turn dissatisfaction into real victories on the ground. Therefore, these elections become not just a vote for mayors and municipal councils, but a test of the entire Italian political system: the right must confirm that its support remains alive at the city level, while the left must prove that it can be not only opposition, but a real alternative to power.
Why Giorgia Meloni remains strong
Despite the defeat in the referendum, Giorgia Meloni remains the main political centre of Italy. Her strength lies in the fact that she managed to turn Fratelli d’Italia from a protest national party into the main party of power. She speaks to society in the language of protection, not only in the language of reforms. For a significant part of voters, she looks like a politician who protects Italy from external pressure, migration chaos, excessive regulation and bureaucratic Europe.
Fratelli d’Italia remains the first party of the country. Partito Democratico holds the position of the second force, Movimento 5 Stelle preserves significant influence, Forza Italia and Lega remain partners of the right-wing bloc, and Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra strengthens the left flank. This means that Meloni remains ahead, but her dominance no longer looks absolutely safe.
If the opposition is fragmented, the right confidently preserves the initiative. If Partito Democratico, Movimento 5 Stelle, Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra and local civic lists manage to reach agreements in the second round, they can win important cities.
This is exactly why municipal elections are dangerous for the right. At the national level, the right-wing bloc looks stronger. But at the city level everything is decided by candidates, local problems, reputation, coalitions, transport, housing, security, taxes, the condition of streets, corruption stories and personal connections.
In the first round, the right can win through discipline. In the second round, the opposition can gather the anti-right vote around one candidate.
Why municipal elections matter for national politics
Municipal elections in Italy do not change the government directly. After the vote, Giorgia Meloni does not lose the position of prime minister, even if the right loses some cities. But such elections work differently. They change the political atmosphere, the media picture, the confidence of parties, the balance inside the coalition and preparations for parliamentary elections.
The municipal level in Italy has great importance because city power is connected not only with roads, schools, transport and local taxes. It is connected with a real network of influence. The mayor, the municipal council, local lists, regional groups, entrepreneurs, professional unions, the construction sector, the tourism business, transport, city services and local media create political infrastructure. Whoever controls the city receives not only a position, but also a constant presence in the life of society.
That is why victory or defeat in a city becomes a signal for the whole country. If the right wins important cities, it shows that its support is not limited to television politics and national slogans. It proves that it is capable of governing a concrete territory, creating local coalitions, nominating strong candidates and maintaining trust at the level of everyday problems.
If the right loses a symbolic city, the blow goes in several directions at once.
The first blow is media-related. Newspapers, television and political commentators begin to speak not about a local mistake by a candidate, but about the beginning of fatigue with the government.
The second blow is coalition-related. Lega and Forza Italia begin to treat the dominance of Fratelli d’Italia and Giorgia Meloni personally with more caution.
The third blow is organisational. Local elites begin to watch whether the political wind is changing before the parliamentary elections.
The fourth blow is psychological. The opposition receives proof that the right can be defeated not only in separate polls, but also in the real ballot box.
Therefore, the phrase “to lose a symbolic city” has a concrete political meaning. It is not simply the defeat of one mayor. It is a blow to the image of the inevitability of a right-wing victory.
Why Venice matters more than Arezzo
Not all cities have the same political weight. Victory in a smaller city may be important for the local structure, but it does not always change the national picture. Victory or defeat in Venice is perceived differently.
Venice has an international name. It is a city-symbol of Italy, a city of tourism, culture, global attention and enormous economic importance. If the right holds Venice, it shows that it is capable of governing not only a protest periphery, but also a complex city with an international reputation, tourist pressure, transport problems, housing, ecology, heritage and a conflict between local residents and global tourism.
If the right loses Venice, it immediately becomes national news. Such a result can be presented as a sign of the weakening of the right-wing bloc in cities where not only ideology is needed, but also complex governance. For Giorgia Meloni, this would be a media blow, because the opposition would receive a strong symbol: even in a major Italian city, the right is no longer the automatic choice.
Arezzo also matters, but differently. It is a city with regional significance, local structures and a concrete political history. Victory there can show the strength of the right or the opposition in Tuscany, but it does not create the same national image as Venice. Arezzo matters for the map of influence. Venice matters for the national symbol.
Therefore, the forecast must separate two levels. One level is the number of communes won. The second level is the quality of the cities won. Sometimes one symbolic victory in a large or recognisable city can create more political effect than several victories in less visible places.
How the second round can change the picture
Municipal elections in Italy are especially important because of the mechanics of the second round. In the first round, parties often run separately, there are many candidates, the protest vote is fragmented, and local lists play an independent role. This is favourable to the right if its coalition is disciplined and immediately gathers its core electorate.
In the second round, the situation changes. Two main candidates remain. Then the choice becomes simpler: for the right-wing candidate or against him. It is precisely in the second round that Partito Democratico, Movimento 5 Stelle, Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra, centrists and local civic lists can unite votes, even if they competed with each other in the first round.
Therefore, the main risk for Giorgia Meloni is not that Fratelli d’Italia suddenly collapses. The main risk is that the opposition learns to gather the second round as an anti-right majority. If this happens in several notable cities, municipal elections will become a rehearsal for the opposition before the 2027 parliamentary campaign.
This is where the real mechanism connecting cities and national politics lies. Municipal elections test not only party ratings. They test the ability of coalitions to reach agreements, unite different groups of voters and turn dissatisfaction into victory.
Youth emigration as a hidden problem of the forecast
The issue of youth emigration must be addressed separately. It is one of the most important structural factors in Italy, because it affects not only the economy, but also politics.
Young Italians often face low mobility, weak wage growth, expensive housing, dependence on the family, unstable contracts and a feeling of a closed future. Some leave for Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and other countries. Formally, these people remain part of Italian society. But politically, many of them disappear from the internal balance.
These are votes that are not in the ballot box. Or votes that become weaker, because a person physically lives outside the country, is less involved in local conflicts, depends less on a concrete mayor, and participates less in municipal politics. That is why any forecast about young people is always incomplete if it counts only those who remained to vote.
Youth emigration distorts the political picture. More of those who are connected with real estate, family, local business, the cash economy, pensions, the familiar way of life and local networks remain in the country. And part of the more mobile, more European, more digital and more reform-minded generation leaves. This does not mean that all young people would vote against the right. But it does mean that part of the potential social energy does not turn into a political result inside Italy.
Therefore, neither the right nor the left fully solves the main question: how to make it beneficial for a young person to build a future in Italy.
The right speaks about protecting small business, family, national autonomy, cash and the traditional economy. But this is not enough if young people do not see income growth, career movement and independence.
The left speaks about social protection, transparency, workers’ rights, education, housing and a fair tax system. But this is also not enough if the state remains slow, bureaucratic, expensive and incapable of giving a young person a quick economic lift.
That is why youth emigration is the weak point of the entire Italian political system. It is a problem that everyone recognises, but no one fully solves.
Election forecast
The main forecast: the right will preserve its political advantage, but the May elections will not be an easy walk for it.
Fratelli d’Italia will remain the main force of the right-wing bloc. Giorgia Meloni will preserve leadership at the national level. Lega and Forza Italia will be weaker than Fratelli d’Italia, but they will still remain important partners in the right-wing coalition. The overall right-wing bloc will preserve its advantage because its agenda is clear to a significant part of society: cash, migration, small business, national independence, less pressure from the European Union, more protection for the traditional model of Italy.
But the result cannot be measured only by the number of communes won. The main question will be which cities are won and which are lost. If the right holds Venice and most of the notable cities, Giorgia Meloni will be able to present the elections as proof of stability after the referendum defeat. This will strengthen her before 2027 and reduce pressure inside the coalition.
If the opposition wins one or several symbolic cities, especially in the second round, the effect will be different. Then Elly Schlein, Giuseppe Conte and allied forces will be able to say that the right can be defeated through unity. This will not destroy the power of Giorgia Meloni, but it will change the mood of the campaign. In politics, mood sometimes becomes almost as important as percentages.
The most likely outcome looks like this: the right holds the overall initiative, but the opposition takes several notable cities and uses this as proof that Giorgia Meloni can be stopped in 2027.
This will not be the fall of the government. It will not be the collapse of the right. But it may become a transition from a phase of confident dominance to a phase of dense competition.
The main political meaning
The May 2026 elections in Italy are important not because they immediately change the government. They do not decide the fate of Giorgia Meloni directly and do not become a parliamentary vote of confidence. Their meaning is different. They show the condition in which the country enters the preparation for the 2027 elections and how alive the support for the right remains beyond national slogans.
If the right holds key positions and does not lose symbolic cities, Giorgia Meloni will enter the next stage as a leader who survived the referendum defeat and preserved control over the political agenda. For Fratelli d’Italia this will be proof of stability. For Lega and Forza Italia this will be a signal that the right-wing bloc still remains useful to keep together. For local elites this will confirm that the political wind has not changed and that the centre of power remains the same.
If the left and centre-left win several important cities, especially through the second round, the meaning will be different. Then Elly Schlein, Giuseppe Conte and allied forces will be able to show that the opposition is capable not only of criticising the government, but also of turning dissatisfaction into real victories. This will not destroy the power of Giorgia Meloni, but it will change the atmosphere before 2027. When power looks inevitable, allies gather around it. When power begins to look vulnerable, allies become more cautious, and opponents become bolder.
Through the Basic Law of Political Economy, this process becomes clearer:
Personality → Behaviour → Choice → Demand → Money
First, the state of personality changes. The Italian begins to feel pressure: tax pressure, digital pressure, banking pressure, migration pressure, bureaucratic pressure or social pressure. Then behaviour changes. He begins to relate differently to the state, the European Union, cash, small business, migration, parties and the future of the country. After that, political choice appears. One part of society chooses the right because it sees in it the defence of familiar Italian autonomy. Another part chooses the left and centre-left because it sees in them a path toward fairer rules, social protection and a transparent state.
This is how behaviour turns into choice, choice creates political demand, and political demand begins to move money, power, parties, cities and the state system. That is why these elections cannot be considered only as a struggle of mayors. At the municipal level, a deeper process appears: Italian society is deciding which model of life should determine the further movement of the country.
The main conflict of these elections is connected not only with migration, taxes or relations with the European Union. The deeper question is broader: which model of freedom will dominate in Italy.
The right speaks about the freedom of cash autonomy. For it, freedom is connected with small business, the family economy, local connections, national independence and the right of a person not to be fully visible to the state, banks and the digital system. It defends an Italy in which money remains a living instrument of everyday life, not only a record in a banking application.
The left and centre-left speak about the freedom of transparent rules. For them, freedom is connected with honest taxation, social protection, strong healthcare, accessible education, normal transport, protection of workers and a state capable of financing its obligations. They believe that without transparency, one part of society will always pay more while another part uses the advantages of the shadow economy.
Both sides speak about freedom, but understand it differently. That is why Italy becomes one of the most interesting countries in Europe. It is not a poor country that simply protests out of despair. It is a rich, complex, living country with a large internal turnover of money, a strong family economy, powerful consumption, a developed culture of cash and deep distrust of excessive control.
But precisely in this strength lies Italy’s weakness. The cash economy gives flexibility, but creates a problem of tax fairness. The family economy gives stability, but often closes the path for young people without family support. Local connections help people survive, but they can slow renewal. A strong culture of consumption shows that there is money in the country, but it does not answer the question of why young people leave and why the future remains closed for many.
Through the Basic Law of Political Economy, the final forecast looks like this: in Italy, not only the party balance is changing, but also the state of personality inside the system. When a person feels a threat to the familiar life, he changes behaviour. When behaviour changes, choice changes. When choice changes, new political demand appears. And this demand already moves money, parties, cities and power.
Therefore, in May 2026, the right will most likely preserve the overall political initiative. Giorgia Meloni will remain the main political leader of Italy, and Fratelli d’Italia will preserve the role of the first force of the right-wing bloc. But the elections may show that the path to 2027 is becoming more difficult. If the left and centre-left take several symbolic cities, especially through the second round, Italy will enter not a phase of the collapse of the right, but a phase of dense competition.
The main conclusion is that Italy is not abandoning the right, but it is beginning to test its limits. Society supports the defence of the familiar model of life, but it is not necessarily ready to give power a full mandate for any restructuring of the state. The left and centre-left receive a chance, but they must prove that they can be not only a voice of criticism, but a force capable of governing cities, reaching agreements in the second round and offering a clear model of the future.
That is why the May municipal elections are becoming not a small local campaign, but an important political measurement of Italy before 2027. They will show who understands the state of society better: the right, which defends old Italian flexibility, or the left, which tries to offer a more transparent and social model of the state.
For now, the advantage remains with the right. But the Basic Law of Political Economy shows the main point: power is not held by the one who simply has a party, a slogan or a leader. Power is held by the one who more precisely feels the change of personality, behaviour, choice and demand inside society.
In Italy, this process has already begun.
Forecast published on 07.05.2026
Iv.Spolan
Author of the model “Basic Law of Political Economy”
