On October 3, 2026, Latvia will hold elections to the 15th Saeima. One hundred members of parliament will be elected. Voting in Latvia and abroad is scheduled from 08:00 to 20:00, and from September 28 to October 2 voters will be able to deposit their vote for safekeeping. Party candidate lists may be submitted from June 20 to July 5, 2026, so the current party map is not yet finally closed, but the main lines of the campaign are already visible.
This campaign cannot begin from someone else’s external frame. For Latvia, such an approach is too narrow. Latvia is a small state: a limited domestic market, limited human resources, limited military mass, dependence on external security, European markets, allies, investments, and regional stability. Therefore, the 2026 election will not only be a struggle between parties. It will be a struggle between different directions for the country’s movement.
The main question of this campaign is what state of society will become dominant by October 2026. It may be social anxiety, irritation against the authorities, fear for security, defense of Latvian statehood, fatigue from old parties, demand for governance, regional everyday life, or the desire to change the rules of politics themselves.
Through the Basic Law of Political Economy, this campaign can be read as follows:
Personality → Behavior → Choice → Demand → Money
First, a person feels their own position: prices, salary, taxes, pension, healthcare, language, security, the war nearby, the role of the EU, NATO, the United States, fatigue from power, distrust of parties, the condition of the region, and the future of the family. Then this state turns into behavior. A person begins to look for a political direction that seems to offer protection. Then behavior becomes choice. Mass choice creates demand. Demand gives mandates. Mandates give access to the budget, laws, positions, and money.
The main forecast of the article
The main intrigue of the forecast is that Ainārs Šlesers and Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may approach the election as one of the most visible forces of the campaign, but still not take first place.
This does not mean weakness for LPV. On the contrary, the party remains one of the main centers of protest voting. But its growth may run into a political ceiling: dissatisfaction with the authorities is distributed among several forces, while part of the electorate will look not for a sharp turn, but for social protection, security, and a more manageable future for Latvia.
There is more than one reason. The protest electorate is divided between several forces. Some dissatisfied voters may go to LPV. Some may choose the social agenda of Progresīvie. Some will remain in the national-state field. Some will look for managerial stability. Some will move toward forces that speak about changing the rules, sovereignty, or direct popular control.
At the same time, Progresīvie may gather social anxiety, part of the urban electorate, part of the supporters of social protection, and part of those who do not want a sharp political turn for the country. For a small state, such a turn is perceived not only as a change of government. It may be perceived as a risk to security, investments, allied trust, the budget, external stability, and internal balance.
Working forecast as of early May 2026
1. Progresīvie
Main figure: Andris Šuvajevs
Forecast: 15.0%
2. Latvija Pirmajā Vietā
Main figure: Ainārs Šlesers
Forecast: 14.2%
3. Nacionālā apvienība
Main figure: Ilze Indriksone
Forecast: 12.0%
4. Jaunā Vienotība
Main figure: Evika Siliņa
Forecast: 10.8%
5. Apvienotais saraksts
Main figures: Andris Kulbergs / Edvards Smiltēns / Edgars Tavars
Forecast: 9.6%
6. ZZS
Main figures: Viktors Valainis / Armands Krauze
Forecast: 7.5%
7. Suverēnā vara
Main figure: Jūlija Stepaņenko
Forecast: 7.0%
8. Mēs mainām noteikumus
Main figure: Alvis Hermanis
Forecast: 6.3%
9. Latvijas attīstībai
Main figure: Artis Pabriks
Forecast: 4.0%
10. Stabilitātei!
Main figures: Aleksejs Rosļikovs / Svetlana Čulkova
Forecast: 3.2%
11. Saskaņa / Saskaņas centrs
Main figure: the old Russian-speaking niche
Forecast: 2.8%
12. Others
Main figures: different forces
Forecast: 7.6%
This is not a retelling of a rating and not a mechanical continuation of the March poll. The forecast is built through the behavior of the personality: whichever state of the voter becomes dominant by October, political choice will begin to shift in that direction. The March SKDS poll conducted for LTV shows only an intermediate picture: at that time LPV was leading with 8.9%, Progresīvie were second with 6.9%, while 26.1% of respondents still did not know whom they would vote for, and 16.2% said they would not participate in the election. That is why first place is not yet fixed. The key issue is not the March distribution of parties, but which state of the personality will prove stronger by October: irritation, social anxiety, fear for security, demand for governance, or the desire to change the rules of politics.
Why Latvia does not vote like a large country
A large country can afford the illusion of full independence. It has a larger domestic market, a larger army, more resources, greater demographic mass, and a greater margin of safety for mistakes. Latvia lives in a different reality. Every serious political decision here is reflected more quickly in security, investments, regions, the budget, allied trust, the cost of living, and the stability of the state.
Therefore, elections in Latvia cannot be viewed only as a competition between party lists. For a small state, elections become a question of direction. The voter effectively decides what type of politics should become dominant: defense of the state, social support, protest against power, economic pragmatism, governability, sovereigntism, or changing the rules of the political system itself.
Latvian statehood
For part of society, the main issue remains the preservation of the Latvian state as an independent political, linguistic, and cultural system. Here, language, education, culture, family, demography, historical memory, security, and the internal core of the state come first. In a large country, these topics may seem like part of an ideological dispute. In a small country, they become a question of stability. If language, school, culture, and the connection between generations are blurred, the state loses not only symbols, but also its internal support.
Institutional stability
Another part of the electorate looks at the election through the ability of the state to function calmly, predictably, and professionally. Here, the legal system, the budget, EU funds, investments, the market, standards, infrastructure, energy, digitalization, and trust in state decisions are important. Such a voter may be dissatisfied with the authorities, but at the same time fears chaos. For this voter, the main question is not only who criticizes the government more loudly, but who is capable of keeping the state manageable.
Allied security
For Latvia, security does not exist separately from domestic politics. The eastern border, NATO, the United States, support for Ukraine, military infrastructure, and the presence of allies directly influence how a person perceives the future of the country. In a large country, security is often perceived as an external topic. In Latvia, it enters the everyday feeling of the state. The voter votes not only for salaries, taxes, and parties, but also for how protected the country will remain in an unstable regional environment.
Economic pragmatism
There is a voter for whom politics begins with the region, the road, the hospital, the school, the municipality, the pension, work, and agriculture. This voter is interested not in grand rhetoric, but in everyday stability. Will there be work in the region. Will the school remain. Will healthcare be accessible. Will the municipality be able to maintain roads. Will life outside Riga become even weaker. For such a personality, the choice of party is linked to a practical question: who will deliver results on the ground, and not only in a television campaign.
Social protection
A separate direction is connected with a person who feels the pressure of prices, taxes, weak healthcare, low salaries, expensive housing, and uncertainty about the future. For this voter, politics begins not with geopolitics and not with party history, but with personal condition. Is there enough money. Is it possible to get to a doctor. Is there support for the family. Is life becoming too expensive. Such a voter is looking not simply for a change of faces, but for protection of the person inside the state. This is exactly where a chance appears for parties that can speak about social anxiety convincingly and concretely.
Sovereigntism
The sovereigntist voter starts from the feeling that decisions are increasingly being made without them. This voter does not necessarily reject the state, but does not trust the closed political system, bureaucracy, external pressure, and decisions that seem detached from society. For this voter, referendums, popular control, more direct participation, and the return of citizen influence over power are important. Such a vote may go to different parties, but its basis is one: the person wants to feel that the state depends on them again, and not only on elites and obligations.
Protest
Protest voting is born from accumulated irritation. A person is angry at the authorities, banks, taxes, prices, bureaucracy, media, old parties, and the feeling of injustice. They may not read programs in detail. It is more important for them to show that the old order no longer inspires trust. Such a voter votes against fatigue, against the closed nature of the system, against the feeling that the state hears only itself. That is why protest can produce a strong result, but it rarely remains united. Some go to a tough leader, others to sovereigntists, others to projects for changing the rules, and others do not come to the election at all.
Changing the rules
The deepest layer of distrust appears where a person stops believing not only in individual parties, but also in the mechanics of politics itself. For such a voter, the problem is not reduced to surnames. They believe that the system is arranged in such a way that responsibility is blurred, parties live their own lives, and after elections the person loses influence again. Therefore, demand appears for changing the electoral order, personal responsibility of politicians, and a new connection between the citizen’s vote and real power.
That is why the Latvian election of 2026 cannot be reduced to one conflict.
Several states of the personality will work inside the campaign at the same time: anxiety, irritation, fear for security, desire for stability, need for social protection, regional fatigue, distrust of bureaucracy, and demand for new rules. Each of these states can become political behavior. Behavior will turn into choice. Choice will create demand for parties. And demand will already give mandates, power, budget, and access to state decisions.
For a small country, the main question is not only who formally wins. The main question is deeper: which direction after the election will strengthen Latvia, and which will make it more vulnerable. One direction may strengthen statehood, institutions, security, and trust. Another may gather protest, but not provide a stable model of governance. A third may speak about protecting the person, but run into budget constraints. A fourth may demand sovereignty, but not explain how to preserve allies, investments, and security.
Therefore, Latvia does not vote like a large country. Here, the choice of party immediately becomes a choice of balance between the internal state of society and the external stability of the state. The smaller the country, the higher the price of a political mistake. The higher the anxiety, the more important it becomes to understand which force not only expresses the voter’s emotion, but is capable of turning that emotion into a manageable future.
Why the forecast cannot be built only on a rating
A rating shows the condition at the moment of the poll. It records the political temperature, but does not explain where society may move by election day. For a forecast, what matters is not only the order of parties in one measurement, but the movement of moods: what will strengthen, what will weaken, which voters will stay home, which will move from uncertainty into choice, and which state of society will become dominant closer to October 3.
The March SKDS data for LTV showed LPV’s lead, but at the same time recorded a high level of uncertainty. More than a quarter of respondents still did not know whom they would vote for, and a significant part said they would not participate in the election. This means that first place cannot be considered secured. When the share of undecided voters is high, the forecast must look not only at the party core, but also at those people whose choice has not yet taken shape.
According to the Basic Law of Political Economy, it is precisely the undecided voter who becomes key. The firm party core is already inside choice. Such a person already knows whom they are voting for, and their behavior is harder to change. But the undecided voter is still at the level of personality and behavior. They feel prices, taxes, fatigue from power, fear for security, distrust of parties, anxiety about healthcare, salary, family, language, region, and the future. This state has not yet become a final choice, and therefore it can be directed toward different political sides.
If irritation against the authorities becomes the main state, part of the vote may go to LPV. If social anxiety proves stronger, the chances of Progresīvie will grow. If fear for language, statehood, and security becomes dominant, Nacionālā apvienība will strengthen. If the voter looks for manageability and predictability, part of the vote will remain with Jaunā Vienotība or move to Apvienotais saraksts. If everyday economic life becomes central, ZZS will receive its space. If distrust of external pressure and closed decisions intensifies, Suverēnā vara may grow. If a person stops believing not only in parties, but also in the political mechanism itself, part of the energy will go to Mēs mainām noteikumus.
The Russian-speaking voter will move separately. This part of society no longer looks like a single political bloc. Some may go to LPV, others to Suverēnā vara, still others to Stabilitātei!, some may remain in the old Saskaņa niche, and some may simply not come to the election. Therefore, the old automatic pattern no longer works. The Russian-speaking vote retains significance, but it looks less and less like one vertical that can be written down in advance for one party.
Therefore, the main question of the campaign is not who stands first in one rating. The main question is what state of the personality will become dominant closer to October 3. It is precisely this state that will move into behavior, then into choice, then into political demand, and only then into mandates, coalitions, power, budget, and money.
The Russian-speaking voter after the war: why the old scheme cracked
Earlier, Latvian politics was often explained through a simple scheme: the Latvian voter votes for parties of the Latvian state core, while the Russian-speaking voter votes for the old Russian-speaking niche. This scheme never explained the whole reality, but after 2022 it became even weaker.
The main mistake of the old analysis was the mixing of the concepts “Russian” and “citizen of the Russian Federation.” The Russian language, Russian culture, a family with Russian spoken at home, or a Soviet biography do not mean automatic political loyalty to the Russian Federation. For Latvia, this is especially important, because a Russian-speaking person may be part of Latvian society, live for the future of their family in Latvia, be dissatisfied with the Latvian authorities, argue with language policy, but at the same time not connect their future with Moscow or Minsk.
After Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, this distinction became even more visible. For part of Latvia’s Russian-speaking residents, Russia stopped looking like cultural or political protection and became a source of threat. Destruction in Ukraine, the Russian invasion, pressure on Kyiv, and the use of Belarus as a territory of military and political pressure changed perception. A person may speak Russian, use a Russian-speaking information environment, and criticize the Latvian authorities, but at the same time not want to find themselves in the zone of influence of the Russian or Belarusian regime.
The SKDS poll published by LSM in 2022 already showed the heterogeneity of this group: among Latvia’s Russian-speaking residents, 40% condemned the Russian invasion, 12% supported it, while a significant part took an uncertain position or gave no answer. This is an important detail for the forecast. The Russian-speaking voter does not disappear as a political factor, but no longer looks like a single automatic resource of one party.
Through the Basic Law of Political Economy, it looks like this. First, there is personality: a Russian-speaking resident of Latvia lives between language, memory, family, the Latvian home, fear of war, pressure of identity, and the question of the future. Then behavior appears: earlier, part of such voters could almost automatically go to the old Russian-speaking party niche. After the war, this behavior became less stable. Choice is no longer automatic, because an openly externally oriented political channel has become not protection, but a risk for some people.
From this, a new demand appears. Instead of one common Russian-speaking demand, different demands arise: social protection, protest against the authorities, desire for peace, fear of Russia, protection of language, distrust of old parties, desire to remain inside Latvia and not be pulled into the Russian-Belarusian political zone. When demand breaks into several directions, it stops giving one party a strong block of mandates.
That is why the forecast for the Russian-speaking electorate must be cautious. It will not disappear and will not become homogeneous. Protest will remain inside it, dissatisfaction will remain, and the memory of the old political niche will remain. But the former vertical has already cracked. The Russian-speaking voter may become not a single bloc, but a field of redistribution between LPV, Suverēnā vara, Stabilitātei!, the remnants of Saskaņa, Progresīvie, other parties, and non-participation.
Stabilitātei! and the Rosļikovs escape effect
Aleksejs Rosļikovs was one of the most visible figures of the party Stabilitātei!. But in April 2026 he left the party leadership and ended up in Belarus. In the logic of this campaign, such a step looks not like an ordinary departure, but like an escape from the Latvian political field. LSM wrote that this escape shook Stabilitātei!, intensified the struggle for the Russian-speaking voter, and that the instability of the party may be used by Latvija Pirmajā Vietā and Suverēnā vara. LSM also noted that Rosļikovs is broadcasting messages from Belarus about closer cooperation with Russia and Belarus, while the party does not reject such pro-Russian rhetoric.
For the hard pro-Russian core, Rosļikovs’s escape may look like a symbol of persecution and conflict with the Latvian authorities. But for the more cautious part of Latvia’s Russian-speaking residents, Belarus is perceived differently. Belarus is associated with the Lukashenko regime, dependence on Russia, and the role of a territory through which pressure on Ukraine was created. Therefore, a politician who ended up in Minsk may not strengthen the old pro-Russian niche, but on the contrary intensify fear of it.
This is where an important forecast appears: the rating of Stabilitātei! may become lower by the election. The party may retain part of the hard pro-Russian core, but it no longer looks like the main center of Russian-speaking protest. After Rosļikovs’s escape, its electorate may begin to break down into several directions. The votes do not disappear, but they stop being gathered into one vertical.
Some votes may go to Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, because Ainārs Šlesers offers a broader Latvian packaging of protest: prices, taxes, banks, power, bureaucracy, and the slogan “Latvia First.” For part of the dissatisfied electorate, Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may look not like the old Russian-speaking niche, but like a stronger protest channel.
Some votes may go to Suverēnā vara, because there the sovereigntist formula sounds: popular control, referendums, distrust of external governance and closed decisions. For a voter who does not trust the authorities, but does not want to follow a weakened Stabilitātei!, this may become a more understandable direction.
Some will remain in the old pro-Russian niche, but with less force. Some simply will not come to the election. Some will begin to vote not as “Russians against Latvians,” but as residents of Latvia who do not want to end up in the Russian or Belarusian political zone.
This factor is also important for the forecast on Šlesers. He may take part of the Russian-speaking protest, but not all of it. Votes from Stabilitātei! do not automatically move in one direction. They may be distributed between Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, Suverēnā vara, the old pro-Russian niche, other parties, and non-participation. Russian-speaking protest is already fragmenting, and Rosļikovs’s escape accelerates this process.
Progresīvie: why they may come first
The main figure of Progresīvie is Andris Šuvajevs. The party nominated him as its leader and candidate for prime minister in the election to the 15th Saeima. He is the head of the parliamentary faction and co-chair of the party.
Progresīvie may take first place not because they are the loudest. Their chance lies elsewhere: they may gather the socially anxious personality, part of the urban electorate, part of young people, part of the supporters of social protection, and part of those who are tired of the current authorities but are not ready to go into a sharp protest turn.
The political line of Progresīvie is built around salaries, taxes, benefits, social protection, healthcare, and a stronger role for the state in protecting the person. In April 2026, the party identified changes in salaries, taxes, and benefits as priorities and drew a red line against cooperation with Latvija Pirmajā Vietā.
For Progresīvie, the main entry point is social anxiety. A person feels the pressure of prices, weak healthcare, uncertainty about salary, fear of taxes, expensive housing, and future family expenses. Then this state becomes behavior: the person looks for a force that speaks not only about big political slogans, but also about the protection of everyday life. If such behavior becomes mass behavior, it moves into the choice of Progresīvie. Then political demand appears for social protection, family support, healthcare, tax justice, and redistribution of the budget in favor of the person.
Forecast for Progresīvie: 15.0% and first place in the working forecast.
Such a result is possible because by October social anxiety may become stronger than pure protest. A tired person may not want to vote for the old authorities, but at the same time may fear a sharp turn, a pro-Russian risk, and conflict with Latvia’s allied security line. Then Progresīvie becomes a channel for those who want change without breaking the country’s external support.
The weakness of Progresīvie is also clear. They may be perceived as too urban, too value-driven, and too liberal. But if they expand the social agenda beyond Riga and show the connection between salary, healthcare, taxes, security, and the budget, they may overtake Latvija Pirmajā Vietā.
Latvija Pirmajā Vietā: why Šlesers is strong, but not unlimited
The main figure of Latvija Pirmajā Vietā is Ainārs Šlesers. LSM wrote that Latvija Pirmajā Vietā had already nominated him as its candidate for prime minister, and that Šlesers’s campaign looks like a return of the old political guard. Latvija Pirmajā Vietā also marked red lines against cooperation with Jaunā Vienotība and Progresīvie.
Latvija Pirmajā Vietā works with the strongest emotion of the campaign: irritation. The voter sees prices, taxes, banks, loans, bureaucracy, weakness of the government, constant conflicts, a feeling of privileges among those in power, and the absence of a clear result. Šlesers translates this state into a simple political formula: the course of governance must be changed, a strong leader is needed, order is needed, money must go to people, there must be less pressure on business and less power for old parties.
For Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, the starting point is the irritated personality. A person feels a loss of control and looks for a politician who speaks sharply, directly, and promises a quick turn. Such behavior may move into the choice of Latvija Pirmajā Vietā as a party of protest and return of control. Mass choice creates demand for a change of governance, reduction of pressure, revision of rules, and punishment of the old authorities. In monetary terms, this demand concerns taxes, banks, pension money, business, the budget, and state procurement.
Forecast for Latvija Pirmajā Vietā: 14.2% and second place.
Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may fail to take first place because of a political ceiling. The protest field is not monopolized. Suverēnā vara takes the sovereigntist protest. Mēs mainām noteikumus takes the anti-system protest against party mechanics. Stabilitātei! retains part of the hard pro-Russian core, but after Rosļikovs’s escape its rating may become lower, and the votes will move in different directions, not only to Latvija Pirmajā Vietā. Part of the Russian-speaking electorate after the war and the Rosļikovs story will not automatically follow a force with a pro-Russian risk. Part of the Latvian electorate may mobilize against a sharp change of direction. Therefore, Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may remain very strong, but not first.
Latvija Pirmajā Vietā should not be described as a simple copy of an old pro-Russian party. It is more accurate to speak about a protest-sovereigntist force with a pro-Russian risk. This risk appears when fatigue from power, prices, and war begins to turn into demand for weakening support for Ukraine, conflict with allies, distrust of Western institutions, and the desire for “quick peace” without clear security conditions.
Nacionālā apvienība: statehood, language, and security
The main figure of Nacionālā apvienība is Ilze Indriksone. The party announced her as its candidate for prime minister; she is the leader of the party, a member of the Saeima, and a former minister of economics.
Nacionālā apvienība works with a personality that perceives Latvia through language, culture, family, security, historical memory, school, demography, and borders. For a small country, this is not a secondary topic. Language and culture in a small state work as a protective mechanism. If they are blurred, the state becomes more vulnerable.
For Nacionālā apvienība, the main state is fear for Latvian statehood. A person feels that without language, culture, school, security, and demography, Latvia may lose stability. This state moves into behavior: the voter looks for a force that protects the Latvian foundation of the state. Mass choice forms demand for language, education, family, demography, security, and culture. In monetary terms, this demand concerns defense, education, culture, family policy, demography, and regional stability.
Forecast for Nacionālā apvienība: 12.0% and third place.
Nacionālā apvienība may strengthen if security, migration, language, Russian influence, demography, and fear of the blurring of Latvian statehood become the main themes of the campaign. But if prices, banks, loans, and taxes become the main themes, part of the energy will go to Latvija Pirmajā Vietā or economic parties. Therefore, Nacionālā apvienība receives a strong core, but not first place.
Jaunā Vienotība: manageability, but fatigue from power
The main figure of Jaunā Vienotība is Evika Siliņa, the current prime minister. LSM noted that she is ready to be the prime ministerial candidate of Jaunā Vienotība, while the party of the sitting prime minister has faced a noticeable decline in support. In the March SKDS poll, Jaunā Vienotība had 5.9%, which was a major drop compared with previous positions.
Jaunā Vienotība works with a personality that fears chaos and a sharp turn. This is a voter for whom the European Union, NATO, budget predictability, international connections, administrative continuity, and state manageability are important.
For Jaunā Vienotība, the main point is demand for predictability. A person may be dissatisfied with the authorities, but at the same time fear that a sharp turn will destroy stability. Then the person looks for experience, administration, international connections, and the ability to keep the state in a manageable condition. Such a choice forms demand for budget discipline, allied security, state continuity, and clear decisions. In monetary terms, this demand concerns European Union funds, investments, defense, the budget, education, healthcare, and infrastructure.
Forecast for Jaunā Vienotība: 10.8% and fourth place.
Jaunā Vienotība may lose emotionally, because power is tired, and the voter sees conflicts, privileges, and weak results. But Jaunā Vienotība may preserve coalition significance. Even if the party does not become first, it may remain important for forming a government without Latvija Pirmajā Vietā.
Apvienotais saraksts: governance and economic discipline
The main figures of Apvienotais saraksts are Andris Kulbergs, Edvards Smiltēns, and Edgars Tavars. Raimonds Bergmanis and Juris Viļums also appear in the public agenda. LSM indicated that Andris Kulbergs is considered the likely candidate of Apvienotais saraksts for the prime ministerial role.
Apvienotais saraksts works with a personality that is tired not only of prices, but of weak governance. Such a voter does not necessarily want an emotional rebellion. They want a more collected state, a normal economy, clear taxes, a budget, regional development, and professional governance.
For Apvienotais saraksts, fatigue from inefficiency becomes key. A person sees weak governance and looks not for shouting, but for a competent team. If this state strengthens, choice may move to Apvienotais saraksts as a party of governance. Mass demand in this case is directed toward economic discipline, reforms, regions, and administrative efficiency. In monetary terms, it concerns taxes, the budget, investments, infrastructure, and the regional economy.
Forecast for Apvienotais saraksts: 9.6% and fifth place.
Apvienotais saraksts may take the voter who does not trust the old authorities, but does not want Šlesers. Their problem is that a rational governance agenda ignites mass emotion less effectively. Their chance appears when the voter becomes tired of noise and looks for calm competence.
Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība: regions, economy, and coalition balance
The main figure in the prime ministerial logic of Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība is Viktors Valainis, chairman of Latvijas Zemnieku savienība and minister of economics. Latvijas Zemnieku savienība, which is part of Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, nominated him as its candidate for prime minister. Armands Krauze, minister of agriculture and a visible representative of Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, also remains an important figure.
Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība works with an economic personality: region, land, work, pension, municipality, road, school, hospital, local infrastructure. This is not the loudest layer of politics, but for a small country it is very important.
For Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, the foundation is everyday economic life. A person lives through the region, municipality, work, pension, road, school, hospital, and local infrastructure. They look for a practical force that deals not only with big statements, but also with concrete issues on the ground. Such a choice creates demand for regions, agriculture, municipalities, pensions, and jobs. In monetary terms, this demand concerns municipal budgets, agriculture, infrastructure, regional programs, and social payments.
Forecast for Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība: 7.5% and sixth place.
Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība may not become a leader, but it may become a balancer. In Latvia, a party with a regional and economic base often gains influence not through first place, but through coalition necessity.
Suverēnā vara: sovereigntism and the struggle for the dissatisfied voter
The main figure of Suverēnā vara is Jūlija Stepaņenko. This force works with a personality that believes that influence has been taken away from the people, and that decisions are made by external centers, elites, or closed political groups.
For Suverēnā vara, the starting point is distrust of closed decisions. A person believes that power makes decisions without them, and that their vote changes nothing. They look for the return of control through popular participation, referendums, and resistance to external pressure. Such a choice forms demand for direct influence, revision of rules, and more internal decisions. In monetary terms, this demand concerns the budget, taxes, European Union funds, defense spending, and external obligations.
Forecast for Suverēnā vara: 7.0% and seventh place.
Suverēnā vara may grow because of Russian-speaking and sovereigntist protest, especially against the background of instability in Stabilitātei!. But its ceiling depends on whether it can show not only protest against external pressure, but also a clear monetary result for the person.
Mēs mainām noteikumus: the anti-system vote
The main figure of Mēs mainām noteikumus is Alvis Hermanis. In February 2026, the party Republika was renamed Mēs mainām noteikumus, and Hermanis became its chairman. The central idea of the party is connected with changing political rules and the electoral system.
Mēs mainām noteikumus works with a person who does not believe not only in a particular party, but also in the party mechanism itself. Such a voter believes that the problem is not only in surnames. The problem lies in the rules by which power is formed and then separates itself from the person.
For Mēs mainām noteikumus, the main state is distrust of the electoral system itself and party accountability. A person looks not simply for a new party, but for a new mechanism. If this state becomes mass, it may move into the choice of Mēs mainām noteikumus as a project for changing the rules. Such demand is directed toward personal responsibility of politicians, changing the electoral order, and a new connection between the citizen’s vote and power. In monetary terms, changing the rules of power changes access to the budget, positions, and state decisions.
Forecast for Mēs mainām noteikumus: 6.3% and eighth place.
Mēs mainām noteikumus may pass the threshold if Hermanis’s visibility turns into stable political behavior. But if the energy remains only around the name, the party may end up below expectations.
Latvijas attīstībai: a modernization vector below the threshold
Artis Pabriks is associated with Latvijas attīstībai. This force may work with a liberal, modernization-oriented voter who connects the country’s future with development, business, reforms, digitalization, Western orientation, and managerial modernization.
For Latvijas attīstībai, the starting point is the desire to see Latvia as a modern, open, and developing country. Such a voter looks for reforms, competence, a business environment, investments, digitalization, and a Western course. If this state becomes choice, demand appears for development, entrepreneurship, infrastructure, and reforms. In monetary terms, this demand concerns business, investments, digitalization, infrastructure, and European connections.
Forecast for Latvijas attīstībai: 4.0% and failure to pass the threshold.
The problem of this force is not the absence of a theme. The problem is competition. A similar modernization voter is already being divided by Jaunā Vienotība, Progresīvie, and partly Apvienotais saraksts. Therefore, the party may receive a noticeable percentage, but fail to enter the Saeima.
Stabilitātei!: the old pro-Russian niche in a state of collapse
The main figures are Aleksejs Rosļikovs and Svetlana Čulkova. But the party is in an unstable condition. LSM wrote that Rosļikovs left the leadership, is in Belarus, and the party is still considering the possibility of his participation in the campaign. At the same time, competition for the Russian-speaking voter has intensified from Latvija Pirmajā Vietā and Suverēnā vara.
For Stabilitātei!, the starting point is alienation from the state, the language of power, and official politics. A person looks for a protest and pro-Russian channel. But after Rosļikovs’s escape, this channel becomes weaker and less stable. Choice begins to break down, because the former party no longer looks like a strong center of representation. Demand for protest remains, but it looks for a new carrier. If this demand does not pass the threshold, it does not turn into mandates, influence, and access to state decisions.
Forecast for Stabilitātei!: 3.2% and failure to pass the threshold.
The main question is not whether this electorate will disappear. It will not disappear. The main question is where it will go. Some may go to Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, some to Suverēnā vara, some will remain in the old pro-Russian niche, and some will move into non-participation. Therefore, the rating of Stabilitātei! may become lower by the election, and its votes may become a resource for other parties.
Saskaņa / Saskaņas centrs: the old Russian-speaking model no longer gathers the former demand
Saskaņa and the old Russian-speaking niche connected with it no longer look like the former center of influence. This segment has preserved historical memory, a social base, and part of the old electorate, but the political market has changed.
For Saskaņa / Saskaņas centrs, the problem begins with the destruction of former representation. A person feels that the old channel no longer works as it once did. They look either for a familiar form of protection, or for a new protest channel, or simply move into non-participation. Demand for representation remains, but it is fragmented. Without crossing the threshold, this demand does not turn into mandates.
Forecast for Saskaņa / Saskaņas centrs: 2.8% and failure to pass the threshold.
This line will be important not as a winner, but as a source of vote redistribution. Even a few percent may change the final result if they do not go to one party, but scatter between several directions.
Why Ainārs Šlesers may not take first place
There are ten main reasons why Ainārs Šlesers and Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may remain one of the strongest forces of the campaign, but fail to take first place.
- The first reason is that protest is not monolithic. Latvija Pirmajā Vietā gathers strong irritation against the authorities, taxes, banks, prices, bureaucracy, and the old party system, but it does not take all protest completely. Some dissatisfied voters may go to Suverēnā vara, because the sovereigntist motive sounds stronger there. Some may go to Mēs mainām noteikumus, because there the main emphasis is placed on changing the rules of politics themselves. Some will remain near Stabilitātei!, some will move into the old Russian-speaking niche, and some will simply not come to the election. Therefore, protest strengthens Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, but at the same time limits its ceiling.
- The second reason is connected with the change of the Russian-speaking electorate during Russia’s war against Ukraine. Inside this part of society there remains a pro-Russian core, but next to it there are people for whom Russia, against the background of the war, has become not protection, but a threat. They may be dissatisfied with the Latvian authorities, criticize language policy, and distrust old parties, but at the same time not be ready to vote for a line that looks like a risk of moving into the Russian-Belarusian political zone.
- The third reason is connected with the escape of Aleksejs Rosļikovs and the crisis around Stabilitātei!. Belarus no longer looks like a place of protection or an alternative for part of the electorate. It is connected with the Lukashenko regime, dependence on Russia, and participation in pressure on Ukraine. Therefore, Rosļikovs’s escape may not strengthen the old pro-Russian niche, but on the contrary destroy trust in it. LSM wrote that Rosļikovs’s departure shook Stabilitātei!, and the struggle for the Russian-speaking voter intensified; Latvija Pirmajā Vietā and Suverēnā vara may benefit in this field. The rating of Stabilitātei! may become lower by the election, and its votes may begin to move to other parties and partly into non-participation.
- The fourth reason is connected with Progresīvie. If by October the main theme becomes not only protest against the authorities, but healthcare, salaries, benefits, taxes, housing, social protection, and fear of poverty, Progresīvie will get a chance to overtake Latvija Pirmajā Vietā. In this case, the socially anxious personality may become stronger than the irritated personality. A person will look not for a sharp turn, but for protection of everyday life and a more manageable model of change. Progresīvie have already identified salaries, taxes, and benefits as priorities and drawn a red line against cooperation with Latvija Pirmajā Vietā.
- The fifth reason is connected with mobilization against a sharp turn. Latvia is a small state, and for it security, allies, the eastern border, investor trust, and the stability of institutions are not secondary issues. If part of society begins to fear that Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may lead the country into conflict with the external supports of security and governance, some undecided voters may move to Progresīvie, Nacionālā apvienība, Jaunā Vienotība, or Apvienotais saraksts.
- The sixth reason is connected with excessive personalization of the campaign around Ainārs Šlesers. A strong personality can quickly gather the irritated voter, because a person looks for a figure who speaks sharply, promises order, and creates a feeling of control. But that same strength may become a limitation. For part of society, Latvija Pirmajā Vietā looks not like a broad political team, but like the project of one leader. The personality of Šlesers mobilizes supporters, but at the same time may stop the choice of those who fear overly personal power, old connections, and concentration of decisions in one pair of hands.
- The seventh reason is connected with the past of Ainārs Šlesers. For part of the electorate, he does not look like a new politician. He is perceived as a representative of the old political guard that has already been inside power, business, influence, and previous agreements. LSM, in material about candidates for prime minister, indicated that among the leaders of the future campaign, it is precisely another appearance of Šlesers that looks like a return of the old guard. This prevents him from fully taking the vote against the old system. A person may be angry at the current authorities, but at the same time not consider Šlesers a real new alternative. In such a case, the protest personality does not necessarily turn into the choice of Latvija Pirmajā Vietā.
- The eighth reason is connected with the image of a businessman in politics. Ainārs Šlesers is perceived not only as a politician, but also as a person from business. For part of the electorate, this may be a plus: a businessman seems practical, tough, able to count money, make agreements, and make quick decisions. But for another part of society, such an image creates fears. People may ask whether the arrival of a businessman in power will lead to the merging of politics, business, state contracts, influence, and personal interests. In a small country, this fear is especially sensitive, because circles of power, business, and media are perceived as closely connected. Therefore, the image of a strong businessman may mobilize supporters of Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, but at the same time repel voters who fear corruption, closed agreements, and managing the state as a personal project.
- The ninth reason is connected with coalition fear. A voter may vote not only for a party, but also for the future manageability of the country. If part of society begins to feel that it will be difficult to build a stable government around Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, some votes may go to parties that look more suitable for a coalition. For a small country, this is especially important, because political chaos is quickly reflected in the budget, security, investments, and trust in the state.
- The tenth reason is connected with the fact that different groups of dissatisfied people want different results. One voter wants to punish the authorities. Another wants to protect salary and healthcare. A third wants to protect language and statehood. A fourth wants a strong coalition. A fifth wants to change the rules of elections. A sixth wants more power for the people. Therefore, even general irritation against the authorities does not create one common choice. It breaks down into different political demands, and each demand goes to its own party.
The result of these ten reasons is simple: Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may remain one of the strongest parties of the campaign, but its first place is not guaranteed. Ainārs Šlesers is capable of gathering a powerful irritated personality, but working against him are the fragmentation of protest, the change of the Russian-speaking electorate during Russia’s war against Ukraine, Rosļikovs’s escape, the growth of social anxiety, fear of a sharp turn, excessive personalization of the campaign, old political baggage, fear of business in power, coalition risk, and the difference of interests inside dissatisfied society.
Forecast by mandates
If the working forecast is applied to parties that pass the 5% threshold, the approximate picture of the 15th Saeima may become very fragmented. In such a parliament, no party receives an independent majority, and first place becomes not the end of the struggle, but the beginning of negotiations about the coalition, government program, budget, and key state decisions.
- Progresīvie may receive around 18 mandates.
- Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may receive around 17 mandates.
- Nacionālā apvienība may receive around 15 mandates.
- Jaunā Vienotība may receive around 13 mandates.
- Apvienotais saraksts may receive around 12 mandates.
- Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība may receive around 9 mandates.
- Suverēnā vara may receive around 9 mandates.
- Mēs mainām noteikumus may receive around 7 mandates.
Such a distribution means not the victory of one political line, but a complex parliamentary knot. Even if Progresīvie take first place, they will not receive independent power. Even if Latvija Pirmajā Vietā comes second, the party will still remain a very strong center of pressure. Therefore, the main question after the election will not only be who came first. The main question will be who will be able to assemble a majority, keep the state manageable, and not destroy the balance between security, social policy, regions, and institutional stability.
Probable scenarios after the election
Scenario one: a coalition without Latvija Pirmajā Vietā
The most likely scenario in this forecast is connected with the formation of a coalition without Latvija Pirmajā Vietā. Its possible basis may be Progresīvie, Nacionālā apvienība, Jaunā Vienotība, Apvienotais saraksts, and Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība. Such a coalition will be difficult not only because of the number of participants. It will be difficult because inside it there will be different political directions, different groups of voters, and different answers to the question of Latvia’s future after the 2026 election.
Progresīvie will pull toward social protection, salaries, healthcare, benefits, tax justice, and a more visible role of the state in protecting the person. Nacionālā apvienība will hold the line of Latvian statehood, language, security, culture, demography, and historical memory. Jaunā Vienotība will be responsible for institutional manageability, allied security, the budget, international predictability, and continuation of the state course. Apvienotais saraksts will emphasize governance, economic discipline, administrative efficiency, and more professional work of the state. Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība will pull toward regions, municipalities, agriculture, infrastructure, and everyday economic life.
Conflicts will be almost inevitable in such a coalition. Disputes will arise around taxes, the budget, social policy, regions, education, language, defense spending, managerial appointments, and ideological issues. It will not be an easy coalition of like-minded forces. Rather, it will be a coalition of necessity, where the parties will be united not by full coincidence of views, but by the desire not to allow Latvija Pirmajā Vietā into power and to keep Latvia within a stable allied, institutional, and security contour.
The main weakness of such a scenario is that the government may be internally conflicted. The main strength of such a scenario is that it preserves manageability, external predictability, and the possibility of preventing a sharp turn. For a small country, this has special significance: a weak coalition may be unpleasant, but a sharp and poorly calculated turn may be more dangerous.
Scenario two: Latvija Pirmajā Vietā comes first or second, but remains in strong opposition
Even second place for Ainārs Šlesers would not mean defeat. Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may become the main voice of protest opposition. In that case, the party will put pressure on any coalition through the topics of prices, taxes, banks, loans, migration, corruption, privileges of power, bureaucracy, and fatigue from the old party system.
This scenario gives Latvia a formally stable government, but a very strong protest opposition. Even without Latvija Pirmajā Vietā participating in power, protest behavior inside society will not disappear. It will wait for government mistakes, weak decisions, internal conflicts, and new reasons for mobilization. The more the future coalition argues within itself, the more strongly Ainārs Šlesers will be able to say that the old system is failing again.
In this scenario, Ainārs Šlesers may not become head of government, but he may become the main political center of the irritated personality. Any rise in prices, any dispute about taxes, any weakness in healthcare, any scandal around privileges, and any managerial conflict will turn into an argument against the authorities. Therefore, Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may fail to take first place, but still remain one of the most influential forces of the next political cycle.
Scenario three: an attempt at a coalition with Latvija Pirmajā Vietā
This scenario is less likely, but politically important. If after the election it is not possible to assemble a stable majority without Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, some parties may begin to discuss cooperation with Ainārs Šlesers. In that case, Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība, Apvienotais saraksts, Nacionālā apvienība, Suverēnā vara, and Mēs mainām noteikumus may become key.
This is where the pro-Russian risk will become not theoretical, but practical. The question will not be about slogans, but about concrete decisions: how policy toward Ukraine, allies, security, media, defense, the budget, the eastern border, and external obligations will change. For a small country, such a scenario is especially sensitive, because any shift of course is quickly reflected in partner trust, investments, security, and the internal stability of the state.
Even if formally such a coalition speaks about the economy, taxes, business, and protecting people, the main question will remain deeper. Will Latvia strengthen its security and institutional stability, or will it begin to enter a period of political deals where irritation against power becomes stronger than strategic calculation. That is why the possible participation of Latvija Pirmajā Vietā in a coalition will be assessed not only through the domestic economy, but also through how it changes Latvia’s position as a small state next to the eastern border.
Scenario four: a weak government and constant protest
If the Saeima is fragmented, the government may prove weak. Then even without Latvija Pirmajā Vietā in power, protest behavior will grow. Any mistake by the coalition will work for Ainārs Šlesers, Suverēnā vara, and Mēs mainām noteikumus. Any conflict inside the government will intensify the feeling that the old system is failing again.
In such a scenario, the 2026 election does not close the political crisis, but opens a new cycle. Society receives a government without a sharp turn, but at the same time preserves strong protest energy. This makes the next political period nervous, conflict-driven, and dependent on whether the coalition can show results in healthcare, salaries, taxes, security, regions, and governance.
For the Basic Law of Political Economy, this scenario is especially important. If the state of the personality does not change after the election, if the person continues to feel irritation, poverty, injustice, weak healthcare, and distrust of power, political demand will not disappear. It will simply move into the next cycle and begin looking for a new carrier again. Then the 2026 election will become not the end of political tension, but a new starting point.
Main conclusion
Latvia in 2026 is choosing not simply a party. Latvia is choosing the main direction of movement for a small country. This is a choice between social anxiety and protest, between manageability and a sharp turn, between statehood and fatigue from power, between regional everyday life and a large political struggle.
If social anxiety becomes the main state, Progresīvie may take first place. If irritation against the authorities becomes the main state, Latvija Pirmajā Vietā may take first place. If fear for language, statehood, and security becomes the main state, Nacionālā apvienība will strengthen. If desire for manageability becomes the main state, Jaunā Vienotība will recover positions. If everyday economic life becomes the main state, Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība and Apvienotais saraksts will strengthen. If sovereigntist distrust becomes the main state, Suverēnā vara will grow. If distrust of the rules of politics becomes the main state, Mēs mainām noteikumus will pass.
The forecast of the article remains as follows: Progresīvie take first place with a small lead, Latvija Pirmajā Vietā takes second place, and Nacionālā apvienība takes third place. The government will most likely be formed without Latvija Pirmajā Vietā, but it will be complex, fragmented, and internally conflicted.
The logic of the Basic Law of Political Economy appears here not as a separate scheme, but as the movement of the entire campaign. The socially anxious personality may become stronger than the irritated personality. The irritated personality will keep Latvija Pirmajā Vietā at a very high level. The Russian-speaking pro-Russian bloc is no longer gathered into one vertical. Rosļikovs’s escape accelerates the collapse of the old pro-Russian niche, while the votes of Stabilitātei! may go to other parties or into non-participation.
For Latvia as a small state, Latvian statehood, institutional stability, and allied security become not separate topics, but conditions of survival. Therefore, money and power will be received not by the one who simply shouts the loudest, but by the one who manages to translate the state of the personality into stable political behavior, then into choice, then into demand, and then into mandates, coalition, budget, and state decisions.
Forecast published on 06.05.2026
Iv.Spolan
Author of the model “Basic Law of Political Economy”
