Why this idea seems wrong only at first glance
At first glance, the claim that the United States and Russia are closer to each other than the United States and Europe may seem strange. Russia is waging war against Ukraine. The United States supports Ukraine. Europe also supports Ukraine. Formally, it seems that the United States and Europe are in one political camp, while Russia is on the other side.
But this article is not about who votes with whom today, who imposes sanctions against whom, and who supplies weapons to whom. It is about a deeper level — the form of state behavior. States can be compared not only by ideology, slogans, and diplomatic statements, but also by how they understand power, borders, law, another country’s choice, and their own place in the world.
At this level, the United States and Russia turn out to be closer to each other than the United States and Europe.
The United States and Russia are not the same. This is fundamentally important. Russia attacked Ukraine and is trying to destroy the independence of a neighboring state by force. The United States remains Europe’s main military ally and one of Ukraine’s key supporters. But despite all the differences between them, they share a common great-power logic: both the United States and Russia think of themselves not simply as countries, but as large centers of power.
A great power does not see itself as an ordinary participant in the rules. It believes that it has special interests, special security zones, a special right to intervene, and a special role in the world system.
Russia does this crudely — through war, threats, territorial seizure, and pressure on its neighbors. The United States does it differently — through bases, fleets, aviation, the dollar, sanctions, alliances, and a global military presence. But the foundation itself is similar: force remains a normal instrument of great politics.
Europe is built differently. After two world wars, modern Europe tried to build a system in which force does not disappear completely, but must be limited by law, treaties, institutions, and collective decision-making.
The world is divided not by ideologies, but by systems of governance
Ordinary political language too often divides the world by labels. Democracy against authoritarianism. West against East. Freedom against dictatorship. Market against control. But such words often prevent us from seeing the main point: the real line of division runs not between slogans, but between systems of governance.
One system shapes behavior through rules, institutions, law, a balance of powers, and a predictable environment. Another system shapes behavior through a center of power that gradually subordinates courts, media, the economy, the army, regions, language, education, and foreign policy to itself.
Russia today is an example of a system in which the center of power absorbs the environment. Formally, there are laws, courts, elections, parties, and state institutions. But the real logic works differently: rules exist only as long as they do not interfere with the center of power. If they interfere, they are changed, bypassed, or turned into an instrument of pressure.
Europe is built differently. In Europe, a leader may be strong, a party may win elections, a government may change course, but the system itself must not dissolve completely into one center. It is limited by courts, parliaments, constitutions, EU law, treaties, the public environment, and other states within the union.
The United States occupies a more complex position. Inside the United States, there are strong institutions, elections, courts, states, Congress, the press, business, and civil society. But in foreign policy, America often acts not as a European legal system, but as a global power state.
That is why the United States can be Europe’s ally without being a European system. An alliance is one thing. The Form of System is another.
The world has never been divided by ideologies. It has always been divided by systems of governance.
The war in Ukraine shows the Russian form of great-power force
Russia’s war against Ukraine is not simply a war over territory. It is an attempt to change the direction of another country’s development by force. Ukraine chose its own political trajectory, its own European orientation, its own identity, and its own future. Russia perceived this not as the normal choice of an independent state, but as a loss of control over a space that Moscow was used to considering its zone of influence.
For European logic, Ukraine is an independent state. It has borders, a people, international recognition, and the right to choose its own direction. For Russian imperial logic, Ukraine is a space that must not fully leave Moscow’s control.
That is why the war against Ukraine is a war against another country’s choice. Russia is trying to stop Ukraine’s transition to another Form of System by force. It wants to return Ukraine to a space where the main center of decision-making is not in Kyiv, but in Moscow.
This is where Russian great-power logic becomes visible. If a neighboring country chooses the wrong direction, it must be punished. If society does not accept the old orbit, it must be broken. If a political choice does not coincide with the interests of the center of power, that choice is declared a foreign project, a threat, a mistake, or a crime.
Europe reacts differently. It supports Ukraine, imposes sanctions against Russia, helps with money, weapons, humanitarian support, and political protection. The EU officially defines Russia’s war as a full-scale war of aggression and links its support for Ukraine to the country’s right to self-defense.
But the important thing is not only the aid. The important thing is the form of reaction. Russia acts through coercion. Europe tries to act through law: sovereignty, borders, responsibility, international crimes, reconstruction, and security.
Iran shows the American form of great-power force
Iran shows the other side of this same topic. The United States is not Europe when it comes to external force. America may speak the language of democracy, security, the fight against terrorism, the protection of allies, the nuclear threat, and global stability. But when Washington considers a threat strategic, the United States reserves the right to act by force.
In this sense, the United States is closer to Russia than to Europe. Not in morality. Not in the causes of war. Not in legal assessment. But in the very principle of great-power behavior.
A great power believes that its interests extend beyond its own borders. It believes that it can strike far from its own territory. It believes that it has the right to combine military pressure, sanctions, blockade, threats, negotiations, and diplomatic bargaining into one system of coercion.
This is exactly how the United States acts around Iran. The conflict with Iran is linked to the nuclear program, Israel’s security, American bases, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, energy, and the entire architecture of the Middle East. In June 2026, Reuters reported on military clashes between the United States and Iran, strikes, attempts at a deal, and the question of reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
For Europe, such a conflict is primarily the risk of a major regional explosion. It means energy, migration, security, terrorism, prices, internal political crises, and a new wave of instability.
- For the United States, Iran is a question of strategic pressure.
- For Russia, Ukraine is a question of a zone of influence.
- For Europe, both conflicts are a risk of the destruction of order and the growth of turbulence.
Different causes. Different regions. Different moral assessment. But the common mechanism is similar: a great power uses force to change the behavior of another system.
The United States and Russia understand the language of force better than the language of Europe
The United States and Russia may be enemies, but they understand one common language — the language of force. Russia understands territory, army, fear, resources, nuclear threat, control over neighbors, vertical power, and a zone of influence. The United States understands bases, fleets, aviation, the dollar, sanctions, intelligence, technological superiority, alliance blocs, maritime routes, and the right to strategic intervention.
This is not the same kind of force. Russian force is often crude, destructive, poor, and imperial. American force is more technological, financial, global, and institutionally structured. But in both cases, force is treated as a natural instrument of great politics.
Europe also has power. Europe has an economy, a market, industry, technology, population, diplomacy, sanction mechanisms, a legal system, and the armies of individual states. But Europe has long tried to live as if law could replace force, or at least place force in second position.
After two world wars, this was understandable. Europe knows too well what happens when force becomes the main language of politics. Europe tried to build a space where a strong country cannot simply crush a weaker one, where borders are not changed by war, and where rules are more important than the desire of one center.
But the problem is that the world has not become European. Russia has returned to open war. The United States has never fully left the logic of a global power. China is building its own force. The Middle East remains a space of constant collision between regimes, resources, armies, and external players.
That is why Europe increasingly faces a hard question: can a system of rules be protected if that system does not have its own full-fledged power contour?
Europe needs power, but not a copy of the United States or Russia
Europe must not become a copy of Russia. That is the path to the destruction of the European idea itself. Russia shows what happens when the center of power places itself above law, above personality, above borders, and above another country’s choice. Such a system may appear strong, but its strength is built on fear, coercion, propaganda, and the constant production of an enemy.
Europe must also not become a copy of the United States. America may be an ally, but it is not a European system. The United States acts from its own interests. Today these interests may coincide with European interests. Tomorrow they may diverge. America protects Europe not because it is Europe, but because it corresponds to American strategy.
That is why Europe needs its own power. Not imperial power. Not power for conquest. Not power for demonstration. Europe needs systemic power that protects law, borders, industry, energy, technology, infrastructure, people, and political decision-making.
Without such power, Europe remains a territory of consequences. Russia starts a war — Europe receives refugees, rebuilds its energy system, imposes sanctions, pays for defense, and faces internal pressure. The United States escalates the conflict around Iran — Europe receives risks for energy, security, migration, and internal politics. China changes production chains — Europe discovers dependence.
That is, other powers act, while Europe often reacts.
In this sense, an EU army is not simply a military project. It is a question of the maturity of the European Union as an independent Form of System. If the EU has a common market, common rules, common sanctions, a common currency for part of its states, and common political decisions, but does not have its own power contour, the system remains incomplete.
The United States is not simply a larger Europe
One of the main mistakes of European thinking is to consider the United States simply a larger Europe. Yes, there is cultural closeness between the United States and Europe. There is NATO. There is a shared history after the Second World War. There are democratic institutions, universities, markets, technologies, media, rights, elections, and a common language of political values.
But the United States is not Europe. The United States is a separate civilizational and great-power system.
America was born as a continental republic that expanded, bought territories, fought wars, displaced peoples, built a huge internal market, created a powerful fleet, a dollar system, global bases, an intelligence network, and technological leadership. The United States has never been only a legal system. It has always been a system of power that combines institutions, money, army, technology, and global influence.
Inside the United States, institutions do indeed play an enormous role. The courts, Congress, elections, states, the press, business, universities, and civil society limit power. But in foreign policy, the United States often acts as a power that reserves the right of exception.
America may demand that others follow the rules, but decide for itself when those rules can be bypassed in the name of security. America may speak about international order, but strike without European consent. America may be Europe’s ally, but it is not a continuation of Europe.
Russia does this crudely. The United States does this technologically and globally. But both countries believe that a great power cannot be an ordinary participant in the rules. A great power wants to be the one that writes, changes, or temporarily violates those rules.
Europe is built differently. Its strength is based not on the right of exception, but on the limitation of exception. That is why an alliance with the United States is important, but confusing an ally with one’s own system is dangerous.
Ukraine and Iran are different wars, but one systemic lesson
Ukraine and Iran are different conflicts. They must not be mixed together as if they were the same thing. Russia attacked Ukraine and is trying to destroy an independent state in Europe. Iran is another region, another history, another system of threats, another role of Israel, another nuclear problem, another balance of power in the Middle East.
But through the Basic Law of Political Economy, one common mechanism can be seen. In both cases, a great power is trying to change the behavior of another system through pressure.
Russia wants to change Ukraine’s behavior. It wants Ukraine to abandon its independent European direction, accept Russia’s zone of influence, stop being an example of escape from the imperial orbit, and once again become part of a space where Moscow determines the limits of acceptable choice.
The United States wants to change Iran’s behavior. It wants to limit Iran’s military, nuclear, regional, and strategic activity. For this, sanctions, military pressure, strikes, threats, diplomacy, intermediaries, frozen money, negotiations, and control over regional alliances are used.
Formally, these are different stories. But in both stories, one principle is at work: force is used as an instrument for changing behavior.
Europe acts differently in these conflicts. In Ukraine, Europe defends the very principle of borders and sovereignty, because without this the European order begins to collapse. In Iran, Europe is primarily afraid of the expansion of the conflict, because the consequences will hit energy, security, migration, and the internal stability of European societies. In June 2026, the European Parliament separately considered the EU’s preparedness for a possible migration crisis after the conflict around Iran.
- That is, the United States and Russia more often produce action.
- Europe often manages the consequences of action.
Europe must stop being a territory of consequences
The main danger for Europe is that it may remain a territory of consequences created by other powers. Russia makes the decision to start a war — the consequences come to Europe. The United States makes the decision to strike or escalate — the consequences come to Europe again. China changes its economic strategy — Europe feels dependence. The Middle East enters a new conflict — Europe receives pressure on energy, security, and migration.
If a system only reacts, it gradually loses the right to shape the future. It may be rich, legal, educated, and technological, but if it does not create its own power, other great powers will take it into account only when they need it.
Europe cannot live forever between the Russian threat and American protection. Such a position makes it dependent. Russia pressures through fear. The United States protects through its own interest. But Europe must have its own interest, its own will, and its own mechanism of protection.
This does not mean rejecting NATO. It does not mean breaking with the United States. It does not mean turning the EU into an aggressive military empire. It means something else: Europe must become a full subject, not merely an economic space waiting for someone else to protect its rules.
Law without force turns into a request. And in a world of great powers, a request is heard only when there is a real possibility of resistance behind it.
European power must be different. It must protect borders, not destroy them. It must protect small countries, not turn them into bargaining chips. It must protect personality, law, and institutions, not subordinate them to a center of power.
But this power must be real. Otherwise, Europe will remain a place where others pay the price for the decisions of great powers.
Main conclusion: the United States and Russia are closer as powers of force
The United States and Russia are closer to each other not because they are friends. They may be opponents, competitors, and participants in different strategic camps. But they are closer to each other as powers of force.
Both countries think in terms of large space. Both see themselves not simply as states, but as centers of world politics. Both allow that force can change the behavior of other countries. Both use military pressure, sanctions, threats, resources, money, fear, bases, allies, and global influence. Both believe that ordinary rules cannot always limit a great power.
Europe is different. Europe tries to live through law, procedure, treaty, institution, compromise, and the limitation of power. That is why Europe is often slower and weaker in the moment. But that is also why Europe is another Form of System.
The war in Ukraine showed that Russia wants to return to a world where a great power has the right to break a neighboring country. The war around Iran shows that the United States also remains a power ready to use force far from its own borders if it considers the threat sufficient.
The European lesson here is very hard: the United States will not always think like Europe. The United States thinks like the United States. Russia thinks like Russia. Europe must think like Europe.
This is not a rejection of the alliance with America. It is a rejection of dependence. An alliance with the United States may be important, but Europe must not confuse an ally with its own Form of System. America protects its interests. Russia pushes through its interests. Europe must create power to protect its interests, its model, and its future.
The world has indeed never been divided only by ideologies. It has been divided by systems of governance.
Today this is visible again.
- Russia is the great-power force of the center.
- The United States is global great-power force.
- Europe is a system of rules that must become a system of power without losing its legal foundation.
Iv.Spolan
Author of the model “Basic Law of Political Economy”
