The Russian Empire did not disappear; it changed its outer forms
The Russian Empire cannot be viewed as a state that simply existed in the past and disappeared after 1917. Formally, the tsarist empire did come to an end, but its internal logic did not disappear. It changed its outer form, moved into the Soviet form, and after 1991 continued to exist in the form of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak not of a completed collapse, but of a long historical process that continues to this day.
First there was the tsarist Russian Empire. After its fall, the Soviet Union appeared and spoke in different words: equality of peoples, friendship, internationalism, the Soviet person. But the centre remained. Moscow remained. The Russian language remained the main language of career, army, science, power and advancement. Peoples were given republics, flags, anthems and formal recognition, but the real freedom of their historical movement remained limited by the will of the centre.
After 1991, many believed that the empire had finally ended. But only the Soviet Union collapsed as a state form. The Russian Federation inherited not only territory, army, nuclear weapons and a place in international organisations. It inherited the main thing: the imperial idea that neighbouring peoples do not have the full right to leave its historical field and independently define their own future.
That is why the Russian Empire is the last great imperial construction of Europe whose collapse we are observing not as archived history, but as a living process. It collapsed in 1917 as a monarchy. It collapsed in 1991 as the Soviet Union. Now its remaining zone of influence is collapsing. And after the loss of this external orbit, the next stage inevitably moves inside Russia itself.
The main deception of the empire was connected with the word “Russian”
The main deception of the Russian Empire was not only in the army, officials, taxes, borders and repression. It was also in language. The empire used the word “Russian” not only as the name of a people, a language or a culture. It turned this word into a political instrument through which different peoples, lands and histories were placed inside one state legend.
In the normal sense, every people has its own name, its own language, its own memory, its own land and its own right to the future. But in the Russian imperial system, the word “Russian” gradually became wider than one people. It began to mean not only cultural or national belonging, but also inclusion in a large imperial construction where the centre decides which history is the main one, which language is the main one and whose future is considered correct.
Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, Jews, Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, the peoples of the Caucasus, Siberia, the Volga region, Central Asia and many others lived in the Russian Empire. Each of them had its own historical trajectory. But it was not in the empire’s interest to recognise them as equal subjects. If different peoples are recognised as independent, the question immediately arises: why should one centre govern everyone?
That is why the word “Russian” became an imperial roof. Through it, subordination was presented as unity, Russification as development, the loss of one’s own memory as common history, and the power of the centre as the natural order. People were offered the idea that they were part of a “great history”, but often this meant giving up their own history. This is how the empire turned different peoples not into a union of equals, but into material for one state construction.
Why the collapse of the empire does not happen immediately, but in waves
Empires rarely collapse in one day. A new border may appear on the map, an old flag may disappear, a state name may change, but the internal logic of an empire often lives longer than its formal outer form. That is why the collapse of the Russian Empire proceeds in waves. First the old form is destroyed, then the new one, then the external zone of influence begins to fall away, and only after that does the question return inside the imperial construction itself.
The first wave was connected with the fall of the tsarist empire. The second wave came with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But after 1991, Moscow did not abandon imperial logic. It continued to view the former republics as its natural zone of influence. This is where the third wave of collapse began: former parts of the Soviet and Russian imperial system began to leave Moscow’s orbit in different ways.
Some countries did this quickly and decisively. Others did it slowly and cautiously. Others found themselves trapped between society, power, war, fear and economic dependence. But the general process is one: Moscow is losing the ability to be the only centre of the future for former participants of its imperial construction. This is no longer theory, but an observable movement of the last decades.
The main point in this process is not only diplomacy and not only formal alliances. The main point is that the inner orientation of peoples and societies is changing. They increasingly see Moscow less as a source of protection, development, future and historical meaning. When this happens, the imperial connection begins to break down even before treaties, governments or borders change.
Finland shows that the imperial threat can remain even after independence
Finland became one of the first examples of leaving the Russian Empire after its collapse. After 1917, it gained independence and was able to preserve its own statehood, language, institutions and separate historical trajectory. This is important for our article because Finland shows that the peoples who had been inside the Russian Empire were not a natural part of the Russian world. They could have their own political will, their own state form and their own idea of the future.
But Finland’s independence did not mean that the Russian imperial threat disappeared. The Soviet Union became a new outer form of the old imperial logic and took part of Finland’s territory during the war. Finland preserved its statehood, but paid for it with war, lost lands and long caution in its relations with Moscow. This shows that after 1917 the empire did not die, but continued to operate in Soviet form.
Finland is important precisely because it was not fully returned to the Soviet empire, but still lived for decades next to its pressure. Its neutrality was not free comfort, but forced historical caution. The country remained independent, but had to take into account Moscow’s power, its military threat and the possibility of new pressure. It was not life inside the empire, but life next to an empire that had not disappeared completely.
The final break with this logic came only after Russia’s new attack on Ukraine. Finland saw that cautious neighbourship with the Russian imperial centre no longer gave a guarantee of security. Its strategic choice then changed: the country joined NATO and secured itself inside the Western security system. In this sense, Finland shows the long path out of the Russian imperial orbit: first independence, then war and loss of territory, then decades of caution, and only then final strategic consolidation outside the zone of fear before Moscow.
The Baltic states left faster because they did not have time to dissolve deeply into the Soviet form of the empire
The Baltic states became the fastest and most successful example of leaving the Russian imperial orbit. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were able to secure their break with Moscow faster than many other former parts of the Soviet system. The reason was not only geography and not only political will. An important factor was that they had spent a relatively short time inside the Soviet form of the empire and had preserved a strong memory of their own statehood.
For the Baltic states, Soviet rule was not a natural continuation of their history, but an occupation and an imposed period. That is why, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they had a clear goal: not to reform dependence on Moscow, but to leave it completely. The European Union and NATO became not merely foreign-policy projects, but a way to secure their historical exit from the imperial space.
The Baltic example is important for understanding the entire article. It shows that leaving Moscow’s orbit becomes possible when society clearly distinguishes its own history from imperial history. Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians did not accept the idea that their future had to be determined through Moscow. They regained the right to their own direction, their own language, their own security and their own place in Europe.
Therefore, the Baltic states should be seen as the first completed external point of collapse of this imperial construction. They did not simply leave administratively. They changed the Form of the System. They left a world where Moscow was the centre and entered a world where the centre of gravity lies in European institutions, national statehood and their own political responsibility.
Ukraine defends its sovereignty and destroys the main myth of the empire
Ukraine became the main front of the collapse of the Russian imperial construction. For Moscow, Ukraine is not simply a neighbouring country. It is a key element of the imperial myth. If Ukraine exists as a separate nation, a separate state, a separate history and a separate political future, then the idea of a “single Russian people” and Moscow’s natural right to neighbouring lands collapses.
That is why Russian aggression against Ukraine has not only military, but also imperial meaning. Moscow is not simply trying to seize territory. It is trying to prove that Ukrainian subjecthood has no right to independent existence. But Ukrainian resistance shows the opposite: a people that defends its language, land, state and right to the future has already left the imperial formula.
Ukraine has also helped Moldova through its resistance. The war showed that neutral existence next to an empire does not guarantee security. If a country does not secure its external course, if it leaves grey zones and old dependencies, the empire will still try to return. That is why the Ukrainian war became a warning to other former participants of the Russian orbit: Moscow does not voluntarily release what it continues to consider its historical field.
From the point of view of the collapse of the empire, Ukraine did the main thing: it turned the question of leaving the Russian orbit into a question of sovereignty, survival and historical memory. After Ukraine, it is no longer possible to say that the Russian imperial system is simply a cultural or linguistic connection. It has shown itself as a force ready to destroy another statehood in order to preserve its own imperial legend.
Central Asia is leaving through culture, demography and new routes
The countries of Central Asia are leaving the Russian orbit differently from the Baltic states or Ukraine. Their movement is less abrupt, more cautious and often less public. But this does not mean that the process does not exist. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan live in a different cultural, religious, demographic and regional logic. For them, Moscow is increasingly becoming less and less the only centre of the future.
Central Asia may preserve the Russian language, labour migration, economic ties and post-Soviet infrastructure. But at the same time, other directions are growing stronger: China, Turkey, the Islamic world, regional ties, their own transport routes, national languages and independent models of development. In this region, the exit from the Russian orbit does not always take place through a political break, but through a gradual change in the centre of gravity.
This is an important type of imperial collapse. The empire may still have influence, but it ceases to be the only one. If Moscow was once the main window to the outside world, Central Asia now has other windows. The more such windows appear, the weaker the old imperial dependence becomes. People and states begin to choose not between Moscow and emptiness, but between several directions of the future.
Therefore, Central Asia shows a slow but deep form of exit. This is not a sudden flight, but a gradual divergence of trajectories. Culture, demography, economy and external ties work here more strongly than a direct political break. But the result is the same: former participants of the imperial system increasingly live less inside Moscow’s historical frame.
Azerbaijan left through the Turkish direction and its own subjecthood
Azerbaijan became a special case in the Caucasus. Its exit from full dependence on Moscow was connected not only with internal politics, but also with deep integration with Turkey. The Turkish factor gave Azerbaijan an alternative centre of power: language, culture, army, economy, regional support and geopolitical direction. This allowed Azerbaijan not to remain fully inside the Russian imperial orbit.
Moscow could influence the Caucasus through conflicts, security, mediation and post-Soviet infrastructure. But in the case of Azerbaijan, this influence was limited by the fact that Baku acquired another strong external vector. Turkey became for Azerbaijan not simply an ally, but a civilisational and strategic support. This changed the balance in the region.
That is why Azerbaijan cannot be viewed as a country fully dependent on the Russian construction. It used the regional situation, energy resources, military modernisation and its alliance with Turkey to strengthen its own subjecthood. This does not make it part of the European logic, as in the case of the Baltic states, but it removes it from the previous scheme in which Moscow was the main arbiter and centre.
Azerbaijan is important in this article because it shows another path of falling away from the empire. Not all former participants of the Russian orbit are leaving for Europe. Some leave for Europe, others for the Turkish direction, others for regional independence, and still others for multi-vector policy. What is dangerous for the empire is not exactly where they go. What is dangerous is that they stop seeing Moscow as the only centre.
Three last external points remain: Belarus, Armenia and Georgia
After the exit of the Baltic states, after Ukraine’s resistance, after Moldova’s European movement, after Central Asia’s independent routes and after the strengthening of Azerbaijan’s Turkish direction, Moscow has fewer and fewer external points of the old imperial orbit left. In fact, today one must look at three main countries through which the remnants of the Russian imperial system are still visible outside Russia’s current borders: Belarus, Armenia and Georgia.
These three countries are important not as a random list. They show the last external shell of collapse. Belarus is held by the force of the regime and dependence on Moscow. Armenia has begun to change its external course and move toward a European choice. Georgia is stuck between a pro-European society and a government that uses fear of war to slow down the European movement. In each of these countries, the old Russian orbit is held in a different way.
Belarus shows coercive retention. Armenia shows gradual exit. Georgia shows conflict between society and power. But in all three cases one thing is visible: the old connection with Moscow no longer works as a natural centre of the future. It is either held by fear, challenged, or gradually replaced by a new direction.
That is why these three countries should be viewed as the last external belt of the Russian Empire. When they too begin to finally fall away, the process will move into the next phase. After the loss of the external orbit, the imperial system faces not only its neighbours, but itself. Then the question will no longer be which former republics have left, but how long Russia itself will be able to hold its internal imperial construction.
Armenia became a confirmation of the MediaIEU forecast
Armenia was long perceived as a country tied to Russia through security, military structures, post-Soviet inertia, economy and fear of regional threats. That is why its European turn is especially important. When even such a dependent and cautious country begins to look for a new external course, it shows that the old Russia-centred system is losing the ability to hold former participants of its orbit.
MediaIEU considered Armenia in advance not simply as a country before elections, but as one of the points of the larger exit of former participants of the Russian imperial construction from Moscow’s orbit. In the forecast on Armenia, the main question was not only who would win the elections. The deeper question was whether Armenia would remain inside the old Russia-centred system or begin to secure a new external course.
This forecast was confirmed through the very logic of events. Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO after Pashinyan stated that the organisation had failed to fulfil its obligations to the country; Armenia then adopted a law creating the legal basis for movement toward the European Union. These steps show that Yerevan no longer views Moscow as the only source of security and future.
Armenia is important as a symptom. It shows that former participants of the imperial orbit may leave not immediately, not abruptly and not without contradictions, but the direction of movement is changing. Even if economic ties with Russia remain, the inner choice has already shifted. If society and power begin to seek security, development and the future outside the old centre, the imperial connection can no longer remain the same.
Georgia became stuck because of the 2008 war, fear and a government playing on that fear
Georgia could have become one of the earliest examples of leaving the Russian orbit. Under Saakashvili, it was oriented toward Europe, reforms, NATO, the fight against corruption and a break with the post-Soviet system. At that time, Georgia looked like a country that had decided to leave the old imperial logic sharply and quickly. But Russia struck Georgia earlier than Ukraine.
The 2008 war left a permanent political wound inside Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After that, Moscow received a powerful instrument of pressure. It no longer had to fully control Georgian society. It was enough to hold the country through fear of a new war. Any sharp European course could be presented as a threat of repeating 2008.
It was on this fear that the formula of power grew: we are not pro-Russian, we are for peace. This formula allowed the oligarchic system to slow down the European path without calling itself directly Russian. Formally, Georgia received EU candidate status in December 2023, but already in 2024 its accession process was effectively stopped, and then the government stated that it would not put the issue of negotiations with the EU on the agenda until the end of 2028.
Therefore, Georgia became stuck not because Georgian society does not want Europe. On the contrary, society has long looked toward Europe. The problem is that the 2008 war became a political hook, and the government learned to use the fear of a new war to hold the country between Europe and the Russian orbit. Georgia remains the last difficult point of the external orbit precisely because a European society there faces a government that slows this choice through fear.
Belarus: what will happen first, regime change or the collapse of Russia
Belarus is the hardest example of external retention in the Russian imperial orbit. Unlike Armenia, where a turn in the external course is already visible, and unlike Georgia, where society is fighting with power for the European direction, Belarus is held through the regime, the security apparatus, fear, dependence on Moscow and the suppression of independent political life. But it is important to distinguish Belarus as a people from Belarus as a regime.
Belarusian society has not disappeared. Belarusian identity has not disappeared. Belarusian protest, language, memory, emigration and the inner will for another country continue to exist. But state power holds Belarus in the Russian orbit in such a way that the free choice of society is blocked. That is why Belarus today does not prove the strength of the empire. It proves something else: without violence and dependence, this connection no longer works.
The main question now is this: what will happen first — regime change in Belarus or the collapse of Russia itself? The two processes are connected. If the regime in Belarus collapses earlier, Moscow will lose one of the last external supports of the old imperial construction. This will accelerate the collapse of the external orbit and intensify the question of the weakness of the centre. If the internal collapse of Russia begins first, the Belarusian regime will lose its main support and may find itself without the force that holds it externally.
That is why Belarus is the key point of transition between the external and internal collapse of the empire. As long as Belarus is held, Moscow can still pretend that the external orbit exists. But if Belarus leaves this orbit, the external shell of the empire practically ends. After that, the question moves inside Russia: to regions, peoples, resources, the centre and the construction of the Russian Federation itself.
After the external orbit comes the internal collapse of Russia
When an empire loses its external orbit, it does not automatically become a normal nation-state. On the contrary, the loss of the external belt returns all internal contradictions to the centre of the construction itself. The Russian Federation is formally called a federation, but in essence it preserves the old imperial vertical: centre, periphery, resources, the language of the centre, rule by force and the subordination of regions.
Not only Russians live inside today’s Russia. Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens, Ingush, Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Laks, Kabardians, Balkars, Karachays, Circassians, Ossetians, Kalmyks, Buryats, Yakuts, Tuvans, Khakas, Altaians, Chuvash, Mari, Udmurts, Erzya, Moksha, Komi, Karelians, Nenets, Khanty, Mansi, Chukchi, Evenks and many other peoples live there. They have their own languages, lands, memory and right to the future.
But in this article the emphasis is not on the internal national question as the first layer. The emphasis is on the fact that internal collapse becomes the next stage after the departure of the last external countries. As long as Moscow has Belarus, Armenia and Georgia as residual external points of orbit, the empire is still trying to maintain the image of an external power. When these points leave or stop being reliable, internal contradictions become much more visible.
Then the question will not only be how many regions may want independence. The question will be broader: why should one centre decide the fate of different peoples, territories, resources and futures? Why do resources flow to Moscow, while regions are left with poverty, mobilisation, dependence and the absence of real choice? This is how external collapse turns into internal collapse.
Why this cannot be stopped by the old imperial legend
The old imperial legend was based on the idea that Moscow could speak on behalf of many peoples. It could present itself as a centre of security, culture, history, power and future. But this construction works only as long as peoples believe that they cannot exist without the centre. As soon as this belief disappears, the empire loses the main thing: not territory, but the right to explain to others their own destiny.
The Baltic states stopped believing in this right and left for Europe. Ukraine stopped believing and is defending its sovereignty through war. Moldova saw that neutrality next to an empire does not save it. Central Asia is looking for other routes. Azerbaijan relies on the Turkish direction. Armenia is beginning a European turn. Georgia is fighting between society and power. Belarus is held by force, not by free choice.
This means that the old imperial formula no longer works as a voluntary connection. It may be preserved through fear, war, money, special services, propaganda, dependence and regimes. But a connection that is held only by fear is no longer a real centre. It becomes a temporary retention before a new stage of collapse.
Therefore, the question is not whether Moscow can still hold separate regimes, groups of influence or dependent structures for some time. It can. The question is different: can it once again become a source of the future for former parts of its empire? The answer is increasingly obvious. No. It can pressure, frighten and destroy, but it is increasingly less able to offer an attractive Form of the System.
How the Fundamental Law of Political Economy explains this process
The Fundamental Law of Political Economy explains the collapse of empire not through a slogan, but through a sequence of movement. First, Personality changes. The reason for this change is not only politics and not only economics. The main reason is knowledge and the open world. When a person gains access to other information, other languages, other countries, other models of life and other ideas of the future, their inner picture of the world changes. They begin to compare. They see that Moscow is not the only centre of history, security, development and meaning.
After that, Behaviour changes. A person begins to speak differently, vote differently, choose different sources of information, allies, work, country, education, security and future. Then Choice changes. Changed Choice forms new Demand. New Demand changes the direction of Money. And the direction of Money gradually changes the Form of the System.
That is why the empire begins to collapse earlier than it becomes visible on the map. First, a person or society stops internally accepting the old centre. This happens when the closed imperial picture of the world collides with the open world. Knowledge destroys fear. Comparison destroys the myth. Access to another life destroys the feeling that there is no future outside Moscow. People no longer want protection from Moscow. They begin to want protection from Moscow.
After that, the direction of money, institutions, alliances, trade, infrastructure and political energy changes. This is how countries leave the imperial orbit. Not immediately through a border, but first through an internal turn of Personality and society. This happened with the Baltic states. This is happening with Ukraine. This is how Moldova is changing. This is how Armenia is moving. This is how Georgia is resisting. This is how Central Asia is gradually moving away.
Our forecast on Armenia was not a random political assumption. It followed from the model of the Fundamental Law of Political Economy itself. If society gains access to knowledge, the open world and a different image of the future, the old imperial connection can no longer remain the same. Armenia became confirmation of this mechanism: first came disappointment in Russian protection, then the move away from the old security system began, then the European choice took shape. This is how the law works: a system changes from within before politicians finally recognise it and before it becomes obvious to society.
Iv.Spolan
Author of the model “The Fundamental Law of Political Economy”
