On 7 June 2026, parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia. All seats in the National Assembly will be elected. These elections will be the first parliamentary elections after the final loss of Armenian control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the exodus of the Armenian population from the region in 2023. Therefore, the campaign will not be an ordinary struggle between parties, but a vote on what model of state should exist next.
Armenia enters these elections in a state of political fatigue, external pressure and internal division. The old security model, linked to Russia and the CSTO, is no longer perceived as reliable. Nobody trusts the Russians. At the same time, a full and rapid turn to the West looks dangerous for part of society, because Armenia remains a small and vulnerable country between Azerbaijan, Turkey, Russia, Iran and the Western direction.
Through the Basic Law of Political Economy, this campaign can be read as follows:
Personality → Behavior → Choice → Demand → Money
First, a person feels their position: the loss of Karabakh, fear of a new war, distrust of old guarantees, fatigue with Pashinyan, distrust of former elites, the desire for security, hope for Europe, anxiety about the economy and the future of the family. Then this state becomes behavior. Behavior turns into choice. Mass choice creates political demand. Demand gives mandates, power, budget, foreign policy direction and control over the future system of the state.
The main forecast of the article
The main forecast is that Nikol Pashinyan and the Civil Contract party are highly likely to retain first place in the 2026 elections. But this will no longer be the victory of the former 2018 wave, nor a victory of full trust. It will be a victory of a transition period: a significant part of society may vote for Pashinyan not because it is fully satisfied with the results of his rule, but because it does not see a safer alternative.
Pashinyan remains the center of the system because the old opposition around Robert Kocharyan, the former elites and pro-Russian forces remains toxic for a large part of society. At the same time, the new pro-European and urban forces still do not look strong enough to replace the government on their own. Therefore, Civil Contract may win against the background of fatigue, but not against the background of enthusiasm.
The second forecast: the main competitor to the government will not be so much the old Armenia Alliance of Robert Kocharyan as the new configuration around Strong Armenia, connected with Samvel Karapetyan and his political project. In the polls, it is Strong Armenia that already looks like one of the main centers of opposition demand, not just a secondary project.
The third forecast: after the elections, parliament will be more fragmented than the current system of power. Civil Contract may remain first, but it will no longer have the previous level of political space. The opposition will become broader, more conflict-driven and more multi-layered.
Working forecast as of May 2026
1. Civil Contract
Main figure: Nikol Pashinyan
Forecast: 30–34%
2. Strong Armenia
Main figures: Samvel Karapetyan / Narek Karapetyan
Forecast: 13–17%
3. Armenia Alliance
Main figure: Robert Kocharyan
Forecast: 7–10%
4. Prosperous Armenia
Main figure: Gagik Tsarukyan
Forecast: 5–7%
5. New Force
Main figure: Hayk Marutyan
Forecast: 4–6%
6. Wings of Unity
Main figure: Arman Tatoyan
Forecast: 3–5%
7. Bright Armenia
Main figure: Edmon Marukyan
Forecast: 2–4%
8. Republic
Main figure: Aram Sargsyan
Forecast: 2–4%
9. DOK
Main figure: Vardan Ghukasyan
Forecast: 2–4%
10. Other forces
Forecast: 15–20%
This forecast is not a mechanical retelling of a single poll. The latest available surveys show Civil Contract leading, but at the same time they also record a strong field of uncertainty and competition for second place. In different polls, Civil Contract remains in the range of 26–33%, while Strong Armenia shows different results, from around 10% to a significantly higher level in some measurements. This means that Pashinyan’s first place currently looks likely, but the format of the future parliament is not yet closed.
Why Pashinyan remains the favorite
Nikol Pashinyan enters the 2026 elections not as the leader of the former revolutionary hope, but as a politician who has survived defeat, a security crisis, the loss of Karabakh and the breakdown of old external supports. His rating is no longer the rating of trust from 2018. But his strength lies elsewhere: he remains the central figure of transition.
For part of society, Pashinyan looks like the person who is at least trying to pull Armenia out of old dependence. His government is associated with a painful but inevitable departure from the former model, where security was tied to Russia and the old Armenian elite. For these voters, the main question is not whether Pashinyan is ideal. The main question is who would be worse.
This is where the logic of a small country works. In a large country, a voter can vote to punish the government. In Armenia, punishing the government may be perceived as the risk of returning to the old system or strengthening external dependence. Therefore, part of the dissatisfaction will not necessarily become a vote against Pashinyan. It may remain inside his electorate as a vote for the less dangerous option.
Why Civil Contract will no longer be the same force
Civil Contract remains the first party, but its electoral base has changed. Earlier, the party could rely on the energy of the revolution, hope for renewal and rejection of the old system. In 2026, that is no longer enough.
Now the Civil Contract voter more often votes not for a dream, but for the continuation of transition. This is a colder and less emotional vote. A person may be dissatisfied with the economy, personnel mistakes, the weakness of the state and the consequences of war, but still believe that the return of the old elites is more dangerous.
This means that Civil Contract may take first place, but its victory will be narrower, more nervous and more conflict-driven. The party will retain power only if it can convince society that the transition to a new external and internal model must continue, not be stopped.
Strong Armenia: the main new challenge to the government
Strong Armenia is becoming one of the most important projects of the campaign. This bloc is dangerous for Pashinyan not because it simply criticizes the government, but because it can gather different types of dissatisfaction: economic, national, anti-government and part of the demand for strong management.
Samvel Karapetyan and the political project connected with him may be attractive to the voter who is tired of Pashinyan but does not want to return directly to Kocharyan’s old political system. Such a voter is looking for a stronger, more economic and more managerial alternative.
The main strength of Strong Armenia is that it may look not like a purely ideological opposition, but like a project of order, money, business, connections and managerial resources. The main weakness is that such a project may be perceived as an attempt at an oligarchic revenge or as the return of the old model in new packaging.
Forecast: Strong Armenia has a chance to become the second force of the campaign and the main center of opposition pressure after the elections.
4. Robert Kocharyan and Armenia Alliance: an old force with a limited ceiling
Robert Kocharyan and Armenia Alliance retain a solid core. This is the voter who sees Pashinyan as a symbol of defeat, the loss of Karabakh and the destruction of the former security system. For this electorate, the main question has already been decided: Pashinyan must go.
But Kocharyan’s problem is not only the image of old power. His weak point is deeper. Kocharyan and the forces close to him relied for many years on the old security model connected with Russia and the CSTO. After Karabakh, this model suffered a heavy blow. For part of Armenian society, Russia began to be perceived not as a reliable ally, but as a force that failed to fulfill its role at the critical moment. In this perception, the CSTO stopped being a working security system and became a symbol of an empty guarantee.
That is why even strong hatred of Pashinyan does not always turn into support for Kocharyan. A person may consider Pashinyan guilty, may want to punish the government, may demand a different course, but still not be ready to return to those who are politically connected with the old pro-Russian system that did not protect Armenia.
Through the Basic Law of Political Economy, this looks as follows: irritation against the government exists, but the voter’s behavior is limited not only by the memory of the old elite, but also by the feeling of betrayal by Russia and the non-functioning CSTO. Therefore, anti-Pashinyan demand does not automatically gather around Kocharyan, but fragments between other opposition directions.
Forecast: Armenia Alliance may enter parliament, but it is unlikely to become the main center of the entire opposition. Its ceiling is limited not only by Kocharyan’s past, but also by the failure of the security system on which he and his political environment relied for a long time.
Prosperous Armenia: the social and economic remainder of old politics
Gagik Tsarukyan and Prosperous Armenia can work with the voter who is concerned not so much with geopolitical slogans as with money, help, connections, social support and economic pragmatism.
This party may be understandable to part of the population that is tired of large historical dramas and wants a simpler answer: work, income, support, local connections, help for people. But the problem of Prosperous Armenia is that it also carries the burden of the old political system.
For part of the voters, this is not a new alternative, but a familiar fragment of the former world. Therefore, the party may enter parliament or come close to entering it, but its growth will be limited by general fatigue with old political figures.
Hayk Marutyan and New Force: urban protest without a full structure
Hayk Marutyan may gather part of the urban protest electorate, especially in Yerevan. His resource is connected with recognition, the urban environment and dissatisfaction both with the government and with the old opposition.
Such a voter does not necessarily want Kocharyan, Tsarukyan or Karapetyan. He may want a new style, more urban politics, fewer old elites and more direct representation.
But the main problem of New Force is organizational depth. Recognition of the leader is not yet the same as a stable party system. To pass the threshold, urban protest must become not just sympathy, but disciplined choice.
Forecast: New Force may become an important urban factor and fight for entry into parliament, but its result depends on whether Marutyan’s personal recognition can turn into mass political behavior.
Pro-European forces: the direction exists, but there is no single center
The pro-European direction in Armenia is strengthening. This is connected not only with Pashinyan’s policy, but also with real changes in the external environment. In May 2026, Armenia held a historic summit with the EU, and the European Union announced an investment and partnership package in the fields of transport, energy and digital connectivity. This strengthens the image of Armenia as a country that is gradually leaving the old Russian orbit.
But the problem of pro-European forces is the absence of one strong center. Part of this space is taken by Pashinyan himself. Part goes to small parties. Part remains in civil society, the media, the expert environment and urban youth.
Therefore, the European vector may win as a direction, but not necessarily as a separate party. This is an important forecast: pro-European behavior may strengthen Pashinyan more than independent pro-European parties.
Russia as a factor of fear and pressure
Russia remains one of the main external factors of the campaign. But its role has changed. Earlier, Moscow could be perceived by a significant part of society as a guarantor of security. After the events of 2020–2023, this logic has been seriously damaged.
At the same time, Armenia is still connected with Russia economically, energetically, through migration and through the Eurasian Economic Union. Therefore, a break is impossible in one move. This is where the main conflict arises: society trusts Russia less and less as a guarantor, but the country still cannot completely leave the old infrastructure.
Russia will work as a factor of pressure on Pashinyan and as a resource for pro-Russian or conservative forces. But it no longer looks like the unconditional center of Armenian security. Even Moscow’s warnings about the incompatibility of movement toward the EU and participation in Eurasian structures show that Armenia has entered a period of choice between different systems.
France, the EU and the United States as a new external support
The Western factor before the elections has become much more visible. France openly supports Armenia’s European direction, and Emmanuel Macron publicly supported Pashinyan in May 2026 and linked Armenia’s future with European logic.
The United States is also strengthening its presence. In February 2026, the United States and Armenia signed an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, which opens the possibility of transferring American nuclear technologies and equipment. This is not only energy, but also a signal of Armenia’s strategic shift away from former dependence.
But the American factor cannot be perceived by Armenia as a fully reliable long-term support. The United States often changes direction after a change of administration, and American foreign policy can sharply turn from one line to another. Afghanistan became one of the clearest examples: a system on which a stake had been placed for years was quickly abandoned, and local allies were left facing a new reality. Under Donald Trump, this factor of unpredictability becomes even more visible, because his policy is often built on sharp personal decisions, deals and changes in tone.
That is why, for Armenia, the European direction may look more reliable than the American one. Europe acts more slowly, more cautiously and more bureaucratically, but this is exactly where its stability lies. The European system depends less on one person and is more strongly tied to institutions, rules and long-term obligations. For a small country that has already faced the betrayal of the old security system, such predictability may be more important than fast promises.
For the voter, this creates a new picture: Armenia no longer looks completely closed inside the Russian zone. But at the same time, the main demand will not simply be for the West, but for a more reliable and institutional support. The United States can provide technology, a political signal and strategic pressure, but Europe looks more stable in this logic. That is why the Armenian choice may gradually shift not simply from Russia to the West, but from personal and abrupt external decisions to a more predictable European system.
10. Why the elections will not be simply a referendum for or against Pashinyan
The main mistake of superficial analysis is to reduce the elections to the question: Pashinyan or not Pashinyan. In reality, the campaign will be more complicated.
Several states of personality will work inside it at the same time:
- fear of a new war;
- fatigue with Pashinyan;
- rejection of the old elite;
- hope for Europe;
- fear of Russia;
- fear of too rapid a turn;
- search for strong management;
- economic anxiety;
- urban protest;
- diaspora pressure.
Each of these states can become behavior. Behavior will become choice. Choice will create demand for parties. Demand will give mandates, power and financial control.
That is why Pashinyan can win even if a significant part of society is dissatisfied with him. His victory may not be the result of love, but the result of the absence of a united alternative.
Why Pashinyan may retain power
There are ten reasons why Nikol Pashinyan and Civil Contract may remain the first force.
- The reason is connected with the fragmentation of the opposition. Different forces oppose Pashinyan, but they do not form a single center. Kocharyan, Karapetyan, Tsarukyan, Marutyan, small parties and pro-Russian groups compete not only with the government, but also with one another.
- The reason is connected with the toxicity of the old elite. For part of society, Kocharyan and the former system remain unacceptable, even if Pashinyan causes fatigue.
- The reason is connected with the growth of the European direction. Pashinyan has become the main bearer of a cautious exit from Russian dependence, and this gives him support from the urban and pro-Western part of society.
- The reason is connected with fear of a new war. Under conditions of threat, part of the electorate may not want a sharp change of power.
- The reason is connected with the fact that Strong Armenia has not yet proven its ability to replace the government. The resource is strong, but trust in the new construction is not yet final.
- The reason is connected with the fact that Russia has stopped being an unconditional guarantor. This weakens the pro-Russian opposition.
- The reason is connected with external support. The EU, France and the United States create for Pashinyan the image of an internationally recognized partner.
- The reason is connected with the administrative resource of power and the recognition of Civil Contract.
- The reason is connected with the fact that part of the dissatisfied electorate may stay home if it does not see a strong alternative.
- The reason is connected with the fact that Pashinyan remains a figure of transition. The thought may remain in society: he made mistakes, but it is through him that the country is leaving old dependence.
Forecast by mandates
If Civil Contract receives around 30–34%, it may remain the largest faction. But parliament will be more complicated than the current one.
The approximate working picture may look as follows:
- Civil Contract: 40–45 mandates.
- Strong Armenia: 18–23 mandates.
- Armenia Alliance: 8–12 mandates.
- Prosperous Armenia: 6–9 mandates.
- New Force or another urban party: 5–7 mandates.
- Other forces that pass the threshold: 5–10 mandates.
The main intrigue will not only be first place. The main intrigue will be whether Pashinyan can gather a manageable majority or whether he will have to work under much stronger pressure from parliament, the street and external players.
Likely scenarios after the elections
Scenario one: Pashinyan retains power
This is the main scenario of the forecast. Civil Contract takes first place, Pashinyan remains the main center of power, but his room for maneuver becomes narrower. In this case, Armenia will continue its cautious exit from Russian dependence and its movement toward closer relations with the EU, the United States and France.
Scenario two: Pashinyan wins, but parliament becomes conflict-driven
This scenario is almost as likely. Power is retained, but the opposition becomes much stronger. Strong Armenia, Kocharyan and other forces receive the opportunity to constantly pressure the government through the themes of security, Karabakh, Russia, the economy and national humiliation.
Scenario three: the opposition receives too many votes for calm governance
If Civil Contract falls below expectations, the country may enter a period of acute political crisis. Then the street, parliament and external players will simultaneously put pressure on the government. But even in this scenario, a united alternative to Pashinyan does not appear automatically.
Main conclusion
Armenia in 2026 is choosing not simply a parliament. It is choosing a model for leaving old dependence.
The main forecast of the article: Nikol Pashinyan and Civil Contract will retain first place, but no longer as the force of former hope; rather, as the power of a transition period. Their victory will be built on three factors: the weakness of a united alternative, the toxicity of the old elite and society’s cautious demand to leave Russian dependence without a sharp destruction of security.
Strong Armenia may become the main new center of opposition. Robert Kocharyan will retain his core, but will not become the figure of the majority. The pro-European course will strengthen, but a significant part of this demand will remain inside the vote for Pashinyan. The pro-Russian niche will remain, but it will no longer be able to regain its former monopoly on the topic of security.
Through the Basic Law of Political Economy, this campaign shows the main thing: the Armenian voter will vote not only for a party, but for a sense of survival. Personality stands between fear of war, memory of defeat, fatigue with the government and hope for a new external environment. This state will become behavior. Behavior will become choice. Choice will create political demand. And demand will determine who receives power, budget, mandates and the right to lead Armenia further.
Forecast published on 16.05.2026
Iv.Spolan
Author of the model “Basic Law of Political Economy”
